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INTRODUCTION
1991 has been described as the "year of missed opportunities". 
The fall of the Mengistu regime and conclusion of the civil war 
in Ethiopia, and the earlier overthrow of Siad Barre's government 
in Somialia seemed to offer real hope for an end to decades of 
conflict and famine in the Horn. Instead, the situation has 
deteriorated. For more that 18 months, Somalia and Northern 
Somaliland have been gripped by a spiral of violence and struc­
tural disintegration that has been largely ignored in the West, 
whilst in Ethiopia, the peace looks increasingly fragile; in a 
deteriorating economic environment, ethnic conflict has esca­
lated, subverting hopes of peaceful consolidation
The trend towards fragmentation and anarchy has also intensified 
in Southern Sudan, where the SPLA has failed to establish alter­
native civil structures, and hopes for the re-establishment of 
basic services, for example in health and education, have 
evaporated. Similarly, in Mozambigue, despite the ending of the 
Cold War, the violence continues. This has been fuelled by 
economic anarchy, inappropriate structural adjustment policies 
and the failure of Western governments to integrate relief with 
national reconstruction.
The present meeting was convened to draw together experience from 
the Horn of Africa and Mozambigue and to examine, firstly why the 
international community has failed to build on the opportunities 
of the new political environment and secondly, how more ap­
propriate and timely relief and rehabilitation programmes might 
be implemented.
Formal presentations and working group discussions focused on:
the relationship between conflict, food insecurity and 
famine
the classification of contemporary conflict in Africa
the need for better contextual analysis as a basis 
for programme and policy responses to conflict
the need to understand the implications of the 'new 
world order' and UN reorganisation, for conflict 
resolution and post-war reconstruction
legal instruments governing relief operations and the right to food
* the role of the international community in conflict re­
lated famine relief, rehabilitation and prevention
Participants were invited from a wide range of backgrounds and 
included economists, anthropologists, experts in nutrition and 
health, human rights lawyers and activists, representatives of 
the NGO community and representatives of donor organisations. Due 
to funding constraints, African representation was restricted to 
individuals based in the UK.
Despite the diversity of speakers, there was a basic agreement 
over underlying 'blockages' within the international system. 
These included:
(i) The problem of fragmentation, inter-agency rivalry and 
weak situation analysis within the UN system. This was com­
pounded by international political disinterest in African 
affairs and prevented the UN from taking a lead in conflict 
resolution or the de-escalation of violence.
(ii) The institutional division of humanitarian emergency 
relief from long-term rehabilitation (classified as 
'development aid') within the donor bureaucracies and aid 
budgets. This resulted in inadequate resourcing and inap­
propriate interventions from the donor community.
(iii) The urgent need for continuing emergency relief to 
consolidate the peace. This incuded rehabilitation of civil 
institutions and services (notably health and education) as 
well as the rebuilding of the rural and urban economy.
The meeting was organised by Save the Children Fund (UK) in col­
laboration with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (LSHTM). SCF supported a review of secondary sources 
related to famine, conflict and food security in six African 
countries (Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia and An­
gola) conducted by researchers based in the LSHTM. This provided 
a starting point for further analysis and debate1.
Celia Petty 
June 1992
1. Macrae J and Zwi A "Food as an Instrument of War in Contem­
porary Africa Famines: A review of the Evidence", London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1992
■SUMMARY OF ISSUES ARISING FROM THE MEETING
JOHN SEAMAN (SCF)
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
War now forms the backdrop against which NGOs work in many parts 
of Africa. Although natural events have been significant in 
precipitating food crises, complex economic decline has played 
an underlying, strategic role. The imposition of Structural Ad­
justment Programmes in many African states has led, in some 
cases, to absolute levels of poverty which have not been ex­
perienced for many years, a polarisation of income within 
countries, and, for many households, a loss of purchasing power 
in the economy.
The huge shift in the global power balance due to the disap­
pearance of the Soviet Union, has led to an increasingly 
totalitarian relationship between Western countries and the very 
poorest countries. Western power is currently unconstrained in 
setting global conditions, and the UN reforms offer little scope 
for negotiation or change.
The world of international aid consists, to a large extent, of 
large donor organisations suffering the problems facing unwieldy 
bureaucracies, and small, often incompetent, NGOs.
There has been a change in the balance of the relationship be­
tween donors and NGOs. Most NGOs are now no longer in full con­
trol of their work, but act as parastatals, dependent on govern­
ment funding. This change has serious implications for the future 
work of NGOs. Firstly, relationships between NGOs and their 
clients will be affected; and secondly, NGOs by acting as sub­
contractors for the delivery of food aid risk becoming proxies 
for the political agendas of donors, and the implementors of 
policies of conditionality, which they themselves have been 
quick to condemn.
ROLE OF NGOs
NGOs range from independent, professional agencies with clear 
strategies, to smaller amateur organisations, and finally major 
parastatal organisations which nevertheless have charitable 
status (this includes some UN agencies whose income includes 
voluntary contributions from individuals). The changing 
relationship between these non governmental organisations, 
governments and donors merits further research.
EMERGENCY WORK
The analytical tools used by donors and NGOs for famine early 
warning and response are widely believed to be simple, well 
developed and reliable. In reality these methods are neither 
simple nor well developed. This leads to a dissonance between 
the views of different players, and response is often more or 
less inaccurate, late and inappropriate.
SHORT-TERMISM
The short-term outlook of many donors and NGOs has led to a focus 
on emergency, life saving activities. This can be severely 
damaging to the prospects for sustainable development, as it can 
undermine structures which have been put together in the face of 
great poverty and difficulty over many years. The division of 
relief from longer term development sets the agenda for relief 
work and the arbitrary definition of disasters by donors can 
seriously constrain NGO activity.
CONDITIONALITY
Political agendas have driven NGOs to increasingly avoid working 
directly with governments and, in effect, to perform a surrogate 
government role; hence the growing (and unhealthy) trend in many 
countries whereby some civil services are provided by NGOs and 
funded by Western taxpayers, with the national government effec­
tively playing no role at all (for example, in Sudan, SCF con­
trols over 50% of the entire drug supply).
NGO STRATEGY
There is a need for NGOs to reach some consensus as to whether 
they work with, or bypass the state. Either NGOs support the ex­
istence of states and reach negotiated agreement with them, or 
they specifically choose to work alternatively, outside the 
centralised power system.
LOBBYING AND ADVOCACY
There is potential for the lobbying and advocacy role of NGOs to 
be developed further , although this activity will become more 
and more difficult in the current world context, in which there 
is one dominant power block and interest in Africa is declining. 
NGOs must be clear as to whom they are lobbying and with what planned effect.
The international legal context has many practical implications 
for NGO work. There is considerable potential for NGOs to lobby 
for the enforcement of international law concerning emergency 
relief under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions.
PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
BACKGROUND
(i) Conflict, Food and Famine
(ii) Destabilisation and the Parallel Economy
CONFLICT. FOOD AND FAMINE: reflections on sub Saharan Africa2
REGINALD GREEN, Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex
1.0 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, famine, in the sense 
of great loss of life, has only occurred in sub-Saharan Africa 
when production crises have combined with armed violence. 
However, Green argued that the impact of conflict on food 
security and the wider economy varied according to:
(a) the intensity, tactics, location and duration of conflict
(b) the nature of basic food crops and the relative importance 
of food crops vs livestock
(c) the importance of state inputs and extension services
1.1 Armed violence has negative consequences for food produc­
tion, distribution, procurement and commercial imports. While the 
indirect effects of war are greater in the input dependent modern 
sector, entitlements at all levels of production (both national 
and individual), are eroded by conflict. The impact of entitle­
ment loss is particularly serious for refugees and the inter­
nally displaced. Entitlement loss is exacerbated when drought 
is superimposed on conflict.
2.0 Conflict situations present food aid donors with acute dif­
ficulties. Information systems are weakened by war; available in­
formation often arrives too late for effective response to be 
formulated; the low efficiency of food aid delivery gives rise to 
major problems of accountability; food aid cannot close the food 
gap in either timing or volume; finally, food aid has been 
manipulated by some donors in an attempt to influence the outcome 
of particular conflicts. In refugee-host government relation­
ships, the food aid process has usually operated more effec­
tively, unless the host government is itself involved in armed 
conflict.
2.1 There is an urgent need for donors to include rehabilitation 
planning in the relief process: between 2-5 years continuing 
emergency aid is required in the post-conflict period to rebuild 
infrastructure, the economy and civilian society. UN agencies 
such as UNICEF and the UNDP have failed to provide a lead in 
rural livelihood rehabilitation. Institutional recapacitation, 
construction, personnel training are equally important in con­
solidating the peace. This fundamental problem is seen to be 
caused by the delinkage of emergency support and development aid 
at donor level and by the decline of donor funds following the 
'emergency' phase. The donors need to address this problem if the 
cycle of violence and economic decline is to be halted.
2. See Annex 1
3.0 Finally, NGOs involved in long-term development projects 
often by-pass national government structures, and programme co­
ordination among the donor community remains poor. These fac­
tors serve to undermine the process of post conflict reconstruc­
tion .
m o t e s  ON THE PARALLEL ECONOMY: Conflict and Disaster Relief in 
the Post Cold War Era3
MARK DUFFIELD, University of Birmingham
1.0 Duffield focused on the 'parallel economy', which he sug­
gested was a useful concept for understanding the rationale for 
conflict in situations where war might otherwise be perceived as 
'mindless anarchy1.
1.1 This argument was based on the following observations:
(i) the parallel economy is a function of the collapse of the 
formal economy.
(ii). the pursuit of illegal economic activities leads to in­
creased levels of violence
(iii) economy- driven violence may serve as a vehicle for 
political violence
(iv) the similarity between the parallel market found in many 
African countries and those in the Eastern bloc lies in the 
de facto collapse of the formal economy. Parallel markets 
can thus be conceived as an adjustment to a negative 
economic climate
(v) . relief aid may serve to reinforce trends towards the
development of a parallel economy; as it constitutes a valu­
able asset introduced into a complex political economy con­
trolled by powerful groups. Food aid may thus constitute 
both an instrument of war and a means of maximising profit 
for key economic actors.
1.2 By the end of the Cold War period, a growing network of 
donor and NGO relief programmes had been established in Africa. 
However, the value of these programmes to national governments 
has become ambiguous. While they provide opportunities for 
fixing advantageous exchange rates and allow the diversion of 
resources, the economic survival of existing elites has become 
threatened by (a) donor/NGO pressure to extend food aid to areas 
where government wished to withhold it for strategic purposes and
(b) the witness function of NGOs.
2.0 From the international perspective, involvement in emergency 
aid operations has led to an awareness among NGOs of the politi­
cal limitations of the international regulatory system. Prior to 
1989, cross border operations were set up to by-pass the politi­
3. see Annex 2
cal contradictions of the international system and avoid conflict 
with government; during this period, significant efforts were 
made by NGO 'cartels' to remain politically neutral.
2.1 Post-Cold War pressures for change within the UN appear to 
be concerned with organisational issues rather than political 
reform. The Kurdish incident had highlighted the inadequacies of 
UN relief agencies to effectively deliver aid; this had led to 
the appointment of an Under Secretary General for Emergency 
Relief, whose brief is to improve operational co-ordination. 
However, the new brief does not address the underlying politi­
cal contradictions inherent in many relief situations.
2.2 The ending of the Cold War has removed the political ration­
ale for giving aid to Africa. A strategic reduction in aid, in­
cluding food aid, to the region has already taken place. The 
withdrawal of bilateral subsidies, previously given to 'friendly' 
governments, may lead to the further demise of the formal economy 
and hence intensify the pursuit of alternative profits through 
parallel markets, thus increasing regional instability. NGOs may 
bear the brunt of this instability, in the context of an or­
ganisationally, but not politically reformed UN.
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
1. Southern Sudan and Somalia
2. Mozambique
3. Ethiopia and Eritrea
Note: This section includes synopses of presentations by named 
speakers with significant points raised from the floor, followed 
by a summary of working group discussions.
INFORMATION AND RELIEF ACTIVITIES IN CONFLICT ZONES: the case of
Southern Sudan
JOHN RYLE, Consultant
1.0 In his presentation, Ryle stressed that relief efforts in 
Southern Sudan have been characterised by a crude framing of the 
situation and dangerous misconceptions. These reflect a lack of 
knowledge of the local economy and local politics.
1.1 During the famine of 1986-8 in Northern Bahr El Ghazal,
relief efforts were impeded by very limited information concern­
ing the food security situation. It was questionable whether any 
advances have been made towards an understanding of past famines, 
and whether agencies are now in a better position to combat the 
current crisis.
1.2 Although some work has been carried out in reconstructing 
the military and political events of 1986-88, which disrupted the 
economy of the Dinka, there remains a serious gap in information 
on either past or current realities. Uncertain estimates of the 
number of civilians affected by famine, and a 'fetishization' of 
numbers, has resulted in an increase of aid into the region. This 
had taken place without any understanding of the nature of the 
local economy. The food economy is now effectively in the hands 
of the SPLA, and claims that food aid relieves pressure on 
peasants remains questionable. However, it has become increas­
ingly difficult to gain information on food security and the im­
pact of food aid, as agencies no longer have access to local 
merchants and other key sources of information.
2.0 There is a need to reconsider basic concepts and categories
used by the West; for example the common concept of 'Southern 
Sudan' implied a unity which no longer exists. A new focus that 
takes into account the increasingly fragmented social and 
economic realities of the region is needed. This should be accom­
panied by efforts to understand local entitlement to food and in­
digenous methods of distribution.
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—
ALEX DE WAAL, Africa Watch
1. De Waal presented a taxonomy of conflict, drawn from contem­
porary experience in sub-Saharan Africa. He argued that regional 
conflict could be classified as follows:
(i) Counter-insurgency conflicts, using conventional military 
forces
(ii) Irregular counter-insurgency conflicts, using non regular 
adjuncts
(iii) Anarchy, ie contending armed groups which fail to exercise 
any recognisable form of government control over territory 
or civilian populations.
The most striking example of this process was the transition of 
Somalia from the conventional counter-insurgency war of the late 
1980s, to the present anarchic situation, which represented the 
third stage. A similar pattern might be emerging in Southern 
Sudan, in the wake of the new split in the SPLA.
2. It is vital that agencies involved in relief should under­
stand the context in which they attempt to provide humanitarian
relief. Citing evidence from a recent visit to Somalia, an 
analysis of the politico-economci power struggle was set out. 
Four main elements were identified:
(i)Political interests: this involved the struggle for 
nominal recognition by the UN, which provides criti­
cal access to donor resources.
(ii) Commercial interests: the struggle for control over
resources in the parallel economy, and the commer­
cial assets of Mogadishu. There is a close inter­
action between the commercial and political 
struggle: Mogadishu's war lords have significant 
business interests, and future commercial gain is 
dependent on holding government office.
(iii) E thnic/clan interests: the s t r u g g l e  for 
ethnic/clan supremacy provides a basis for the pursuit of
political and commercial interests.
(iv) Armed forces: the warring armies are not paid, 
and therefore provision themselves by violence and looting
among the civilian community.
4. See Annex 3
3.0 There has been a serious analytical failure on the part of 
the UN which had ignored the underlying causes of anarchy in 
Somalia. Under Secretary General Jonah's proposed a solution of 
February 1992 merely addressed the political dimension of the 
conflict and ignored points (ii), (iii) and (iv). The UN has 
failed to recognise that the provision of substantial 
humanitarian relief, which would relieve the pressure to loot, 
remains a pre-requisite for a settlement.
POINTS FROM THE FLOOR
1. Wars are about resources: who controls them and how they are 
exploited. A complexity of ideologies is therefore involved in 
conflict situations. It is necessary to reach a balance between 
an awareness of ideology, and an understanding of the nature of 
conflict. Local realities must be recognised, and these might not 
be properly encompassed under Western categories; even terms 
such as Sudan, Southern Sudan, government, SPLA .
2. The UN's failure to grapple with the underlying nature of 
developing crises, including those in Jigjiga, Harar and Southern 
Sudan is fuelling instability in the region, and requires urgent 
action from the international community.
3. The breakdown in government and the rule of law leads to in­
cremental violence; for example, a major difficulty for the fu­
ture is the shift in behavioural norms resulting from young 
people growing up in conflict.
WORKING.GROUP ON SOUTHERN SUDAN
CURRENT SITUATION
The SPLA has little access to relief air services and it has been 
government strategy to cut overland supply routes to the 
South. Recent attacks in the South have significantly reduced 
access to the area, and destabilised the political organisation 
of local communities. As control of land changes, so does the 
capacity to deliver food aid. However, the current information 
base is extremely weak, and the claim of a huge famine in the 
South, made by the SPLA, is probably false.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NGO WORK
The lack of information on Southern Sudan, due to political, 
climatic and geographic restrictions, creates problems and 
impedes effective decision-making. Little is known of the food 
security situation in the South, but any information that 
indicates a need for food aid assists the fund-raising activities 
of NGOs. This raises questions about the motives for involvement 
of some of the agencies working in Southern Sudan.
There is a dearth of information on the current economic and 
political situation, or on the survival of traditional life. NGOs 
working in this area do not have a long history of involvement; 
although some agricultural work was supported by NGOs early in 
the 1980's, this has not been sustained. A certain amount of 
ethnographic material exists, from the 1940's and 50's, and later 
from the 1970's and 80's. However, these were periods of relative 
peace in Sudan, and so do not document the way in which people 
deal with frequent wars, and develop strategies to cope. An 
understanding of the cultural dynamics and the varying needs of 
different social groups is vital for effective NGO work. Often 
donor/NGO assumptions are misguided. For instance, in a situation 
where people live on cattle, early warning techniques such as the 
assessment of nutritional levels, will be inappropriate (signs of 
malnutrition will not show until cattle are lost through 
d r o u g h t /c o n f 1 i c t . ) The problem of risk a s s e ssment of 
asset-holding groups has not been adequately addressed by NGOs.
Lack of information has led to difficulties in understanding the 
local and wider economies, and assessing the availability of 
resources in the region. To understand the overall situation, the 
effects of an international war on a semi-subsistence economy 
must be understood.
The impact of famine and conflict may differ between different 
social groups. War may have less impact on wage earners than on 
those who rely upon assets such as cattle. Although the 
tradition of brideprice may give some security to cattle-owning 
pastoralists, cattle are vulnerable assets and easily lost.
Heavily commoditized farmers growing cash crops, and trading on 
the state or border markets, face different risks. These 
different social groups require different forms of support.
LEGITIMACY
Who should be involved in relieving the situation in Sudan and in 
what capacity? This issue is of particular significance in 
Southern Sudan where previously many agencies chose to operate 
with the then SPLA (now split into several factions) , and not the 
government. NGOs must address the question of whether to 
collaborate with host governments or local groups, and assess the 
possible consequences of collaboration. Selective work may 
polarise the existing divides. NGO categorisations of the current 
situation are also misleading. The SPLA does not recognise the 
concepts of "North" and "South" Sudan, so a clear ideological 
divide needs to be addressed.
FOOD AND FAMINE: Tools of War in Mozambique 1
ALEX VINES
1.0 Alex Vines described the manipulation of food security 
systems for strategic advantage by all parties involved in the 
civil war in Mozambique.
1.1 Government counter-insurgency tactics have resulted in the 
large scale displacement of populations. This has exacerbated 
existing civilian food security problems. Relocation activities 
have resulted in a total dependence on emergency food aid among 
entire populations.
1.2 Renamo has used food aid resources to set up patronage 
systems in areas under its control. Renamo terror tactics also 
include the extensive destruction of food crops and food 
security.
2.0 Widespread leakage and corruption had been reported in 
distribution systems. Up to 75% of emergency food aid is believed 
to havd been diverted onto parallel markets in the main urban 
areas. [This point was contested by a number of people in the 
audience]
3.0 Effective delivery of food aid to civilian populations 
remains a pre-condition for sustainable peace in Mozambique.
3.1 There will be a continuing, and increased need for food aid 
during the resettlement process, if a is cease-fire achieved.
1. See Annex 4
THE POLITICS OF FOOD AID TO MOZAMBIQUE2
JOSEPH HANLON
1.0 Hanlon argued that, over a ten year period, food aid has 
been used by Western donors to manipulate the internal politics 
of Mozambique, and to undermine government institutions. Food 
security has been undermined throughout this period by the 
destabilisation tactics of South African-backed forces 
(MNR/Renamo) and the subsequent struggle between government and 
Renamo rebels.
2.0 During the major famine of 1983, when Mozambique was closely 
linked with the Soviet bloc, international food aid was withheld 
and only released in 1984, when the government 'turned West'. 
Similarly, a 'donor strike' in 1986 was lifted when the 
government agreed to implement a World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme.
3.0 The question of control over food aid resources revealed 
continuing tension between the government of Mozambique and 
Western donors. Food aid leakage has been used as a pretext by 
donors to circumvent government structures. While some degree of 
leakage was an inevitable result of low wages and poor record 
keeping, claims of government corruption were often manipulated 
by donors to increase their control over relief systems. This 
probelm was exacerbated by the fact that no accounting system for 
food aid had been set up in Mozambique. Hanlon claimed that the 
situation had been deliberately created by donors in order to 
take control of distribution.
3.1 A parallel system for food aid has been set up by the 
donors; ironically, this has undermined government efforts to 
integrate food aid distribution with the private, commercial 
sector. The US has continued to exercise its control over food 
aid distribution through the agency CARE, and through 
church-based organisations. CARE's virtual monopoly over food aid 
distribution and its use of State Marketing Board (SMB) lorries, 
had led to the disruption of national production and marketing 
systems. This caused problems throughout the country: for 
example, in Inhambane, a drought area, farmers were unable to 
sell tree crops used in soap-making, which could have been sold 
in exchange for food. The aid system had destroyed the marketing 
network throughout the country and was impeding the process of 
national reconstruction.
4.0 Finally, Hanlon argued that the US select aid agencies to 
work in different provinces, and that both the US and the EC are 
united in not wanting food to be distributed by the Mozambican
government.
2. see Annex 5
POINTS RAISED FROM THE FLOOR
1. It is important to present information about food aid in war 
situations with caution, and to recognise the political 
implications of this information. Stories of army/government 
corruption implied that most food was lost in this way. However, 
many other factors might account for this leakage; for example, 
shrinkage due to maldistribution among church agencies was well 
above 25%.
2. The US and EC were funding largely the same set of NGOs, and 
some NGOS had been set up uniquely to receive bilateral funding. 
The lack of an independent funding bas created an overlap between 
donor and NGO interests.
WORKING GROUP ON MOZAMBIQUE
FAMINE AND CONFLICT
Drought does not necessarily lead to famine. However, conflict 
can greatly increase existing food insecurity and transport 
problems. Mozambique should be considered a case where war is 
having a greater effect than drought, in that the state is being 
subjected to a process of organised destabilisation. Obviously, 
many inter-related factors are involved. The question is whether 
the relative importance of these factors can be assessed
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
It is important to remember that Mozambique is currently the only 
country facing a Structural Adjustment Programme in a time of 
war: no civil servant in the country can be assumed to be
receiving a living wage. A situation exists where participation 
in the informal sector/parallel economy (activities which may be 
considered as corrupt by Northern donors) is a strategy for 
survival.
WORK OF NGOs
It was claimed that many NGOs working in Mozambique should be 
considered "captive agencies", selected by USAID to carry out 
food relief on the basis of similar interests and political 
outlook (the "conspiracy of interests"). These agencies often 
have no development capacity or logistical skills, and can 
exacerbate existing problems. Agencies enter a local situation 
with their own agenda, which can contribute to the breakdown of 
existing structures and coping mechanisms. For example, some 
agencies have been known to distribute free food aid in times 
of good harvest, thereby undermining local market systems.
There is a need to understand the nature of the work of Western 
agencies operating in Mozambique, including both their 
expectations and activities.
ACCOUNTABILITY
It was stated that accounting procedures in Mozambique were very 
unreliable and that fraudulent documents were often produced.
The high "leakage" rate of food aid presented a real problem of 
accountability. 25% leakage is a conservative estimate in the 
case of Mozambique, and is far higher than figures tolerated in 
many other countries. However, this figure should be placed in 
context: NGO administration costs often exceed this shrinkage
rate and outside Africa, there are cases where there has been a
far greater "loss" of funds, for example with aid to Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan. Donors should address the question of how 
much leakage can or should be tolerated.
Many donor demands for accountability and the control of relief 
operations are unrealistic. This presents a conflict between 
donor interests and priorities and those of beneficiaries. Donors 
are keen to prevent any wastage/corruption and want a clear 
indication of how food aid and counterpart funds are distributed. 
This can lead to rigid bureaucracy, inappropriate behaviour and 
logistical difficulties. For example, the EC insists on separate 
distribution systems for commercialised food aid and emergency 
food aid. These food supplies are transported on different 
lorries, leading to a rigid logistical split between people 
waiting for food who can afford to pay and those who cannot.
The situation in Mozambique can only be understood if the wider 
economic context is recognised: Structural Adjustment Programmes 
have exacerbated poverty and increase the likelihood of 
corruption and leakage.
FEEDING OF COMBATANTS
Agencies providing food aid must accept the reality that a 
certain amount of aid will be distributed to the army and 
government institutions; this makes claims of NGO neutrality 
highly problematic. Attempts to control leakage have had a 
negative effect on the most vulnerable groups. For example, 
agencies have taken measures to deprive guards/drivers 
supervising food aid convoys from taking a share of the goods. 
This in turn has resulted in convoys not reaching their planned 
destination. In the same way, attempts to cut leakage to 
government and/or army staff, whose wages remain unpaid due to 
government bankruptcy, has led to demands for taxes in kind from 
local farmers. An effective way forward may be to provide the 
military with a proportion of food aid on condition that a 
specified amount reaches its planned destination.
FAMINE AND CONFLICT: the case of Ethiopia in the mid-1980s
JOHN SEAMAN, SCF
1.0 The focus on conflict in the analysis of famine in Ethiopia 
during the mid 1980s has led to a distorted view of famine 
causality in the country as a whole. Ethiopia in the mid 1980s 
suffered from an overall lack of entitlement and an absolute 
lack of resources. Regardless of heavy military spending or the 
actual conduct of the war, it is unlikely that the government of 
Ethiopia had sufficient resources at its command to deal with the 
drought that culminated famine in 1984-5.
2.0 The crisis of the mid-1980s could described in terms of (i) 
drought and environmental factors, (ii) policies of the 
government of Ethiopia (including those of the pre-revolutionary 
regime) and (iii) policies of Western donors . The significance 
of the conduct of the war in relation to each of these elements 
was assessed.
2.1 The famine was tracked historically and geographically-from 
the localised drought in southern Tigre of 1982 to the 
catastrophe that culminated in 1984-5. The outstanding feature of 
the drought was its unprecedented geographical spread and its 
uncharacteristic progress; whereas famine in Ethiopia typically 
originates in the lowlands and spreads North East, this famine 
had spread South West through the highlands, to cover the whole 
of Wallo and most of Shewa.
2.2 War clearly had an adverse effect on production; however,
the existence of direct causal link between insecurity and famine 
was not compelling. Trade continued both inside and outside the 
war zone: there was evidence of TPLF grain purchases as far south 
as Waldia.
2.3 Government relocation policies could be traced to the late 
1970s; the motive for these policies changed over time. However, 
the impact of relocation on the flow of material could not be 
quantified in relation to the present case.
2.4 Relief in areas outside the war zones was no more effective 
than relief within them. Even where military considerations did 
not arise, rural populations in government held territory 
received little or no more than they did in the north.
2.5 The highest camp mortality rate ever recorded was among
displaced people in Shewa; this was due to inappropriate relief 
strategies and was unrelated to conflict.
2.6 The Mengistu government was spending at least 70% of the 
national budget on the war. However, irrespective of this 
expenditure, it is unlikely that Ethiopia could have relieved the
far greater "loss" of funds, for example with aid to Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan. Donors should address the question of how 
much leakage can or should be tolerated.
Many donor demands for accountability and the control of relief 
operations are unrealistic. This presents a conflict between 
donor interests and priorities and those of beneficiaries. Donors 
are keen to prevent any wastage/corruption and want a clear 
indication of how food aid and counterpart funds are distributed. 
This can lead to rigid bureaucracy, inappropriate behaviour and 
logistical difficulties. For example, the EC insists on separate 
distribution systems for commercialised food aid and emergency 
food aid. These food supplies are transported on different 
lorries, leading to a rigid logistical split between people 
waiting for food who can afford to pay and those who cannot.
The situation in Mozambique can only be understood if the wider 
economic context is recognised: Structural Adjustment Programmes 
have exacerbated poverty and increase the likelihood of 
corruption and leakage.
FEEDING OF COMBATANTS
Agencies providing food aid must accept the reality that a 
certain amount of aid will be distributed to the army and 
government institutions; this makes claims of NGO neutrality 
highly problematic. Attempts to control leakage have had a 
negative effect on the most vulnerable groups. For example, 
agencies have taken measures to deprive guards/drivers 
supervising food aid convoys from taking a share of the goods. 
This in turn has resulted in convoys not reaching their planned 
destination. In the same way, attempts to cut leakage to 
government and/or army staff, whose wages remain unpaid due to 
government bankruptcy, has led to demands for taxes in kind from 
local farmers. An effective way forward may be to provide the 
military with a proportion of food aid on condition that a 
specified amount reaches its planned destination.
FAMINE AND CONFLICT: the case of Ethiopia in the mid-1980s
JOHN SEAMAN, SCF
1.0 The focus on conflict in the analysis of famine in Ethiopia 
during the mid 1980s has led to a distorted view of famine 
causality in the country as a whole. Ethiopia in the mid 1980s 
suffered from an overall lack of entitlement and an absolute 
lack of resources. Regardless of heavy military spending or the 
actual conduct of the war, it is unlikely that the government of 
Ethiopia had sufficient resources at its command to deal with the 
drought that culminated famine in 1984-5.
2.0 The crisis of the mid-1980s could described in terms of (i) 
drought and environmental factors, (ii) policies of the 
government of Ethiopia (including those of the pre-revolutionary 
regime) and (iii) policies of Western donors . The significance 
of the conduct of the war in relation to each of these elements 
was assessed.
2.1 The famine was tracked historically and geographically-from 
the localised drought in southern Tigre of 1982 to the 
catastrophe that culminated in 1984-5. The outstanding feature of 
the drought was its unprecedented geographical spread and its 
uncharacteristic progress; whereas famine in Ethiopia typically 
originates in the lowlands and spreads North East, this famine 
had spread South West through the highlands, to cover the whole 
of Wallo and most of Shewa.
2.2 War clearly had an adverse effect on production; however,
the existence of direct causal link between insecurity and famine 
was not compelling. Trade continued both inside and outside the 
war zone: there was evidence of TPLF grain purchases as far south 
as Waldia.
2.3 Government relocation policies could be traced to the late 
1970s; the motive for these policies changed over time. However, 
the impact of relocation on the flow of material could not be 
quantified in relation to the present case.
2.4 Relief in areas outside the war zones was no more effective 
than relief within them. Even where military considerations did 
not arise, rural populations in government held territory 
received little or no more than they did in the north.
2.5 The highest camp mortality rate ever recorded was among
displaced people in Shewa; this was due to inappropriate relief 
strategies and was unrelated to conflict.
2.6 The Mengistu government was spending at least 7 0% of the 
national budget on the war. However, irrespective of this 
expenditure, it is unlikely that Ethiopia could have relieved the
famine without external assistance. Logistical costs would have 
at least doubled the cost of grain and would have defeated the 
effort.
3.0 The Ethiopian famine and the relief effort of the mid-1980s 
illustrates very clearly the disordered relationship between 
donors - who have control over resources - and those who need 
them. It was the political interests of donor governments, 
rather than Mengistu's military expenditure or low agricultural 
output related to the war, that determined the outcome of famine 
for drought-affected people in Ethiopia during this period.
WAR AND DROUGHT: The Destruction of Food Security in Eritrea 
BERHANE WOLDEMICHAEL, Research and Information Unit, Eritrean 
Relief Association (ERA)
1.0 The economy of Eritrea has been devastated by prolonged 
drought and a war lasting 30 years. Woldemichael gave a graphic 
account of his impressions on returning to Eritrea after 20 
years' exile; environmental degradation had denuded the
highlands and completely transformed the landscape.
2.0 Farming activities have virtually halted, leaving an 
extremely fragile social structure. Rural communities are almost 
entirely dependent on external economic support; even the most 
wealthy rural families have been stripped of their assets and are 
now destitute.
2.1 In addition to successive droughts, agricultural activity 
was severely disrupted by the war: movement was been restricted, 
and able bodied men were conscripted to the army, leaving only 
the elderly, women and children in villages. Communication with 
families abroad was been severed, resulting in the loss of vital 
remittance income. Factors relating to the impact of drought and 
war was set out in an ERA study of 1987.
3.0 Woldemicheal stressed the need for continuing aid in post­
conflict recovery and reconstruction programmes. However, 
decisions about the type of aid should lie strictly with 
recipient countries. Any mismanagement of aid was a reflection on 
the recipient country, and so raised the question of how to bring 
about responsible governance.
This point was expanded in response to a question from the floor:
Repressive governments were a major cause of conflict in Africa. 
The world community was too ready to recognise governments that 
seized power by force and ruled against the will of a majority of 
the people; human rights groups necessarily focused on prominent 
individuals, although this only scratched the surface of 
suffering caused by such regimes.
FURTHER POINTS FROM THE FLOOR
RESETTLEMENT STRATEGIES IN ETHIOPIA
What might be seen as policies of socialist transformation also 
had counter-insurgency motives. Such policies included (i) 
forced relocation of civilians and (ii) restrictions on trade and 
aggressive interruptions of trade (eg systematic bombing of 
market places was carried out to force traders to use state 
marketing systems.)
3. see Annex 6
NGOS AND GOVERNMENT
NGOs faced a dilemma in deciding whether to work with 
governments, and if so, whic^i governments to support. Should 
NGOs deal with g o v e r n m e n t s  that are u n e l e c t e d  and 
unrepresentative of civilians?
DONORS
Since the 1984-5 famines in the Horn, donors were less 
complacent and more organised. Thus, whilst the Western 
community was politically aligned in opposition to the Sudanese 
government, a bureaucratic structure existed to organise the 
donors' emergency response and guarantee a supply of food aid. 
Although donor policies had changed since the mid '80s, 
flexibility of response was still limited and the definition of 
"relief" was excessively narrow.
WORKING GROUP ON ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
Ethiopia after Mengistu provides a useful case study for problems 
relating to post-conflict emergency relief and rehabilitation. If 
the rehabilitation of Ethiopia and Eritrea is successful, then 
this may provide a model for future post-conflict reconstruction 
in other areas. Conversely, if it fails, there will be lessons to 
be learnt from the missed opportunity.
CONFLICT DYMANICS
Neighbouring governments (ie Somalia and Sudan) have, in the 
past, fuelled conflict in Ethiopia/Eritrea. Peace is vital at a 
regional level, not only to reduce physical disruption, but to 
encourage trade. The international community should address the 
wider issue of regional trade, and recognise the importance of 
regional economic integration in sustaining peace. By supporting 
economic rehabilitation, donors and NGOs can make an important 
contribution towards regional stability.
COSTS OF REHABILITATION
The end of war does not remove the need for relief; in fact, the 
need for relief may increase in the post-conflict period. For 
example, the rebuilding of lost herds is crucial to the recovery 
of both agricultural and pastoral areas, but can only take place 
over the long-term; food aid, or an alternative appropriate means 
of assistance, needs to be provided during this process.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The restoration of peace means that vital environmental issues 
can be addressed. However, some of the environmental effects of 
war may be irreversible. General environmental decay has led to 
an accelerated rate of urbanisation. These problems pose 
increasing challenges to the work of NGOs, both at programme 
level and for their advocacy activities.
The resumption of peace has brought a new set of complex 
environmental problems. For example, in Eritrea freedom of 
movement has led to increased deforestation in the lowlands as 
highlanders make up for the shortage of firewood. This activity 
has been forbidden by the Eritrean government in an attempt to 
protect the environment, but will have a negative economic impact 
in the short-term, as the lowland population will lose an 
important source of income
LONG TERM REHABILITATION
There is confusion between the need for relief and the need for 
rehabilitation; this is partly due to the conflict between the 
short term, aid-led agenda, and the long term issue of 
sustainable development. There is an increasing recognition by 
NGOs of the links between relief and development work: cessation 
of war increases, rather than decreases the need for support. The 
particular strategies required for economic rehabilitation will 
vary according to social and economic groups. For example, in 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, the length of time required for full 
rehabilitation will be greater among pastoralist than 
agricultural communities: pastoralists may require food aid for 
up to 5 years, while herds recover. It is also likely that 
environmental problems will be better resolved if there is 
confidence in the livestock market, leading to improved livestock 
and pasture management.
ECONOMIC SITUATION
NGOs are working in a region of structural economic decline. 
Conflict may arise from the unstable economic situation, for 
example, from disputes over the control of the parallel economy.
Despite environmental problems, there is nevertheless 
considerable potential for regional economic development in the 
post-conflict context. However, this will require new thinking on 
the part of the UN, the World Bank and other major donors.
The considerable economic interdependence and complementarity 
within the region needs to be exploited in the interests of long 
term stability.
THE WORK OF NGOs
The greatest immediate problem facing the region is the 
transition from relief to rehabilitation. NGOs may have a more 
i m p o r t a n t  role in this p r o c e s s  than is g e n e r a l l y  
recognised-particularly in view of the neglect by large Northern 
donors of long term issues in the region.
To consolidate peace, the links between the social, economic and 
political dimensions of complex situations needs to be examined 
more closely. This is a precondition for appropriate donor and 
NGO policies and programmes
There is now a recognition by both UN agencies and donors, of the 
need for an earlier response to potential crises. This includes 
support for the economic infrastructure as well as the provision 
of emergency relief. The case of Somalia is a stark example of
the links between a decline of the economy and the breakdown of 
security and peace. There is a risk that, without appropriate 
donor action, Eritrea and Ethiopia may suffer a similar fate.
NGOs have a key role in the education of donors and the public 
about the need for continued assistance.
THE POLICY CONTEXT:
LEGAL ASPECTS 
1991: THE YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
ROUND UP OF POLICY ISSUES
LEGAL ASPECTS
THE LEGAT, FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF IN SITUATIONS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT7*-  
DENISE PLATTNER, ICRC
1.0 Denise Plattner discussed the relevance of international 
humanitarian law for NGOs and relief agencies. Under the Geneva 
Conventions, governments are obliged to accept relief supplies 
which are humanitarian, non-discriminatory and impartial. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has traditionally 
played a leading role in implementing relief actions on behalf of 
civilian populations in conflict; however, the Geneva conventions 
also cover the activities of NGOs and other agencies.
2.0 The following issues were discussed:
(i) The position of international organisations and non 
government organisations in international humanitarian law 
(IHL)
(ii) The rights and obligations of sovereign states in ensuring 
access to humanitarian relief in situations or armed 
conflict
(iii) Means of implementing IHL: the relationship between the
application of IHL and relief activities
(iv) The potential and limitations of IHC in situations of 
internal conflicts; the differences with regard to the 
rules governing international armed conflicts.
3.0 Points of special relevance for implementation and 
enforcement were outlined:
(i) The ICRC has a duty to 'ensure respect for humanitarian 
law'. However, no institution was expressly empowered to 
monitor the application of humanitarian law by all parties.
(ii) Article 18, Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions states 
that the 'legal government' must give its consent to an 
offer of relief services, even if the relief operation is in 
favour of a civilian population under the control of rebel groups.
4. see Annex 7
(iii) There is a distinction in law between a government's 
mandatory responsibility to accept relief supplies and 
consent for the implementation of relief operations. This 
may present a severe constraint on the effective functioning 
of relief actions.
(iv) The ICRC is the sole body with the statutory right to engage 
in activities aimed at preventing v i o l ations of 
International Humanitarian Law. However, Plattner proposed 
that the UN and human rights organisations had a role to 
play in putting pressure on governments which violated IHL. 
International organisations should seek to adopt a 
collaborative approach to these problems.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HTTMANTTARIAN LAW
FRANCOISE HAMPSON, University Essex
1.0 Francoise Hampson described the international legal 
framework for relief operations in situations of armed conflict 
and pointed to possible strategies for encouraging its 
implementation.
1.1 The International law of armed conflict is embodied in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional protocols adopted 
in 1977. A legal commitment to permit relief operations covers 
all signatories to the Geneva Convention: the legitimacy and 
authority of a government is thus in itself challenged when it 
fails to accede to international law. This offers potentially 
powerful leverage for human rights organisations and the 
international community.
1.2 In conflict, the starvation of civilians is prohibited and 
food, as a civilian object, cannot be made the object of an 
attack.
1.3 Under international law, there can be no external 
intervention to control internal wars: however, Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Convention provides for the protection of civilians 
and applies to all conflicts, including internal rebellions etc. 
It would be legitimate to include the protection of civilians 
from starvation under Common Article 3.
2.0 The UN is slow to react to the particular issues raised by 
internal conflicts. The intervention in Kurdistan was the outcome 
of a unique set of circumstances and is unlikely to be repeated; 
even here, the 'threat to an adjacent state' was invoked to 
legitimise the Allied relief effort.
2.1 The ending of the Cold War would not necessarily lead to a 
new role for the UN in the provision of relief to victims of 
armed conflict; and there was considerable scepticism throughout 
the Third World that a New World Order where the US 'made the law 
and kept the law' would work in the interests of the South. 
However, there remains considerable scope for putting pressure on 
states asked to provide emergency relief (such as USA, UK, 
France) to ensure that pressure is exerted on states violating 
IHL.
2.2 The appointment of an Under-Secretary General for Emergency 
Co-ordination did not signal a new political drive from the UN: 
rather it constitutes a move to make existing resources go 
further and appease donor governments.
5. see Annex 8
3.0 Despite the absence of structural change within the UN, 
several areas were identified where relief agencies could work 
more effectively within existing international law. It was 
possible to invoke an existing, body of enforceable law, rather 
than repeat the customary morai arguments
3.1 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions imposes an 
obligation on states to ensure that other states respect their 
own obligations. Any state - the UK for example - could insist 
that a state experiencing internal conflict itself respects the 
rules on the protection of civilians contained in Common Article
3. It was also possible to insist that rebels respect those 
rules. This was potentially a more effective device than that 
presented by the human rights framework. Pressurising governments 
to make use of Common Article 1 offered considerable potential 
for embarrassing them, and could be a strong lobbying point for 
NGOs.
1991: THF. VF.AR QE MTSSED OPPORTUNITIES
iqQI: THE YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
MARK BOWDEN, SCF
1.0 The theme of this presentation was the failure of the 
international community to support the restoration of civilian 
government and the rehabilitation of effective state structures 
in a vital transitional period. Drawing on experience from 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Mozambique, Bowden 
described 1991 as the "year of missed opportunities".
1.1 The failures of 1991 revealed a series of fundamental 
problems in current donor and UN policies relating both to 
emergency relief and to post-conflict rehabilitation.
(i) In Somalia, failure to support state structures in key 
sectors such as health, education and relief, had 
contributed directly to the descent into anarchy.
(ii) In Southern Sudan, there had been little engagement with the 
SPLA, and inappropriate relief mechanisms may have 
contributed to the current level of social fragmentation in 
the South
(iii) Finally, increasing levels of insecurity in Ethiopia 
reflected the unwillingness of the donor community to engage 
in serious economic reconstruction and rehabilitation. This 
was also a continuing problem in Mozambique, where donor 
policy had undermined state structures in the relief sector 
since the mid '80s, and Structural Adjustment Programmes 
were further weakening the social and economic base.
2.0 These failures were analysed as follows:
2.1 The international aid community is biased against support 
for State infrastructure in relief operations. The NGO focus in 
relief operations is damaging and has given many NGOs power 
beyond their expertise. NGOs acting outside government structures 
create enclaves and erode local government structures.
2.2 The prevailing 'good governance' philosophy of Western donor 
governments ignores the need for basic state structures to 
support the fabric of the social system. It is important to 
distinguish between recognition of political figure-heads and 
support for essential government services such as health and education
2.3 Relief operations have been planned and implemented without 
an adequate analytical framework. The UN has been unable either 
to develop an adequate analysis of the situation in the Horn, or 
to engage in a regional overview. Its information base has been 
poor, with country representation relying on secondary 
information or rumour.
2.4 Overlapping interests of UN organisations eg UNICEF, UNHCR 
and WHO, have also created major difficulties. In Somalia, UN 
agencies have failed to include the Ministry of Health in the 
planning of their activities.
3.0 NGOs currently provide 'top down' relief for individuals. 
This should be extended to include civilian infrastructure 
support: eg monetisation of food aid to stabilise internal
markets. The maintenance of civil structures is necessary for 
the ongoing delivery of services and provides the basis for 
post-conflict rehabilitation.
4.0 There is a need for NGOs to address the problem of how to 
engage with organisations and groups without necessarily 
conferring on them political legitimacy
POINTS RAISED FROM THE FLOOR
NGOs, DONOR POLICY AND LONG TERM NEEDS
NGOs often establish their own relief mechanisms because states 
do not want relief and/or there is no state mechanism to provide 
relief (although the potential to create such capacity might 
exist). NGOs are increasingly forced into a donor framework which 
undertakes relief in order to meet the immediate needs of 
individuals, and is not intended to provide for long term 
development. The contractual relationship between NGOs and donor 
governments in emergency operations has become a trap for many 
NGOs.
There is a need to develop innovative mechanisms for the 
provision of relief. For example, in North West Somalia, an 
attempt had been made to monetise food aid, in order to 
establish a financial base for government services. (This had 
failed due to high-level corruption).
In by-passing state structures, NGOs were neglecting a moral 
responsibility to consider the long-term consequences of their 
action. NGOs should both support and complement national 
structures, if there is potential for work at this level.
There was a possible tension within NGOs between the long-term 
commitment often needed to achieve lasting benefits, and the 
resource demands made by new emergencies.
PDT.TCV ISSUES
POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE MEETING
(Summary of issues idenfied by working groups in the final Policy 
and Programmes session).
Following presentations by Mark Bowden, Francoise Hampson and 
Denise Plattner, working groups discussed wider policy issues 
arising from the meeting.
The importance of sound contextual analysis, and of sustained 
donor commitment to long-term economic rehabilitation were 
prioritised by all the groups. It was recognised that the 
increasing danger of warlordism would have critical implications 
for NGO work over the coming decade, and that problems arising 
from the current, fragile peace in Ethiopia, might be replicated 
in other states.
THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
* It is necessary to work from a sound information base to 
analyse both the nature of conflict and its impact on the 
local food economy.
* It is important to distinguish between conflicts such as 
those in Eritrea and Tigray which are essentially internal, 
indigenous anti-government movements, and conflicts such as 
that in Mozambique and Angola, which are imposed on the 
population by external forces. Appropriate NGO policy should 
be formulated to deal with the particularity of these 
situations.
NEUTRALITY AND NGO INVOLVEMENT
* NGOs working in conflict zones are generally seen as neutral 
although they do not normally require the agreement of both 
sides to work in a conflict, unlike organisations such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
ICRC itself often faces problems of neutrality, for example 
politicians frequently determine the localities in which it 
can operate. In practice, NGOs frequently have difficulty in 
supporting their claim to neutrality, given the political 
pressures which influence their operations in the field.
Civilians are rarely the only beneficiaries of aid, and in 
reality no NGO is entirely neutral, in that its assistance 
may benefit the military.
* Food aid can be used as a weapon of war, and the
manipulation of this assistance by political and military 
groups implies a direct bias. As a result, the very 
presence of an NGO may itself provoke attack, as MSF has 
experienced.
* The semblance of impartiality is important in carrying out
effective support, and NGOs working in conflict situations 
need to establish methods of convincing the parties to the 
conflict of their neutrality. Outsider perceptions of 
neutrality often depend upon the nature of work being done; 
food aid and medical aid are generally considered neutral 
spheres. NGOs such as Save the Children Fund can claim their 
neutrality by working with specific vulnerable groups such 
as children and women. However, not all NGOs are even handed 
in supporting populations on both sides of the conflict.
* NGOs need to deliberate carefully before deciding which
group they will work with. Detailed information is needed to 
assist the decision making process.
RELIEF AND WAR
* NGOs should take account of the following considerations in 
programme planning:
(i) The assessment of food security problems, and the planning
and distribution of relief aid, are particularly difficult 
in conflict situations, where the economy and infrastructure 
have been disrupted. Parties to the conflict may stand to 
gain by being associated with the delivery of relief to 
areas they hold, and by denying access to relief supplies in 
areas controlled by their opponents.
(ii) The unpredictability of war-related food crises also creates 
special problems, as food aid interventions have an average 
lead time of 5 months.
(iii) Logistical considerations, rather than relative need, may 
determine distribution patterns.
(iv) Work often has to be confined to one particular area or 
social group; this assumes a homogeneity which may not exist 
in reality.
* The United Nations could play a stronger role in 
guaranteeing the safe passage of food aid, and ensuring 
neutrality in the delivery of humanitarian relief. The use 
of UN military escorts to deliver food aid may be an 
appropriate strategy.
EARLY WARNING
* There is a widespread lack of understanding of the process 
of famine: on-going surveillance and appropriate famine 
early warning systems are needed to determine when 
intervention is actually required. Many governments and 
agencies are not equipped to carry out this work 
effectively; research is required to identify early stages 
of food insecurity and to examine the impact of different 
responses.
* Famine early warning systems could potentially operate in 
some conflict situations. If the tactics of the warring 
parties are understood, population movements might be 
predicted and interventions targeted accordingly. The 
priority must be to support populations before their 
situation becomes desperate. In many cases, national 
governments may be aware of impending famine, but have no 
real means of taking preventive action.
AGENCY APPROACHES
* Preventing large numbers of deaths by an operational focus 
on food aid alone may not be possible. However, food aid is 
not the only type of aid necessary in war time; aid for 
establishing health and sanitation services is also vital. 
Although some NGOs and UN agencies (eg. UNICEF) work in 
other sectors, such as health and sanitation, in emergency 
situations this is often on a small-scale, and very 
localised.
* In 1986, around 100,000 refugees returned voluntarily to 
Tigray from Sudan, despite the war, because of heavy rains. 
In situations such as this, NGOs have an important role to 
play in helping returnees, both from outside the country or 
from resettlement projects. However, NGO assistance is 
itself dependent on the support of major donors.
* Aid is also vital in the post-conflict situation, when 
increased support may be required to stabilise and improve 
the prospects for lasting peace and development.
* Many agencies working in relief operations do not address 
structural long-term development problems for a variety of 
reasons. In conflict situations a developmental approach is 
more difficult and perhaps impossible.
Fashions in development thinking are constantly changing: 
after the famines of the mid-1980s, much was written on the 
transition from emergency relief to long term development. 
However, the conceptual move from relief to development has 
not been realised in practice; the current crisis in Africa 
is part of a set of deeply rooted structural problems that
can only be understood in their global and historical 
context. The current crisis cannot be solved by simply 
replacing one simplistic development model with another.
SEPARATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF FROM DEVELOPMENT
* There is a rigid separation of "emergency" and "development" 
work within donor bureaucracies. This reflects political 
decisions about the allocation of resources. Emergency 
relief has narrowly defined humanitarian objectives and 
operates within a very limited time frame. For example, EC 
regulations do not permit the use of seeds or metal tent 
poles in emergency operations, as benefits will extend 
beyond the Commission's 6 month timescale for relief. 
Similarly, emergency assistance must be directed to 
individuals known by the implementing agency to be at risk. 
Thus, an agency (SCF) request for a contingency relief 
stock in Ethiopia was met by a demand for a beneficiary 
list from a major donor.
* The' fragmentation of the economy in conflict situations 
reinforces the short-term "emergency" outlook, and it is 
difficult to develop strategies for the long-term. This has 
a direct impact on the work of NGOs. Even if agencies are 
well prepared for a crisis, donor restrictions, and the 
bureaucratic split between emergency and development aid may 
limit NGOs to providing short-term relief.
THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF WAR
* Although the framework for discussion focused on countries
currently facing conflict and famine, the questions of
long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction were also
addressed. Little is known of how communities adapt during 
periods of conflict to effect survival. Similarly, little 
attention has been paid to the problems communities face in
adjusting to peace. For example, post-war Uganda still
faces great rehabilitation problems caused by the collapse 
of social and cultural structures, and large sectors of the 
country's population are suffering from conflict related 
problems of poor mental health and physical disability. 
These issues need to be addressed by donors and NGOs in 
assessing future needs in these countries.
CAPACITY BUILDING AND WORKING WITH GOVERNMENTS
* The disintegration of civil institutions and the rise of 
war lordism point to a real need for NGOs to support 
government structures. However, it is important to clarify 
what is being supported, and how this may or may not effect 
the survival of an oppressive regime.
* The impact of material assistance and strengthening of
governmental structures depends upon which levels of 
government are involved. Planned intervention at strategic 
levels of management systems can be very successful, eg. SCF 
has often worked at both central and local government 
levels where different types of intervention can be 
complementary.
* Working with local structures can have long-term benefits, 
particularly in building "institutional memory", which 
provides an foundation for future work, once the NGO 
withdraws. Although running an autonomous programme has many 
attractions for NGOs, this creates a parallel system that 
reflects the NGOs own priorities and administrative 
structures. Such programmes are unlikely to be sustained by 
the host country.
* It is difficult for NGOs to work even-handedly in countries
with strong, totalitarian regimes (eg. the government of 
Iraq during the Gulf War crisis; the government of Sudan). 
Similarly, working within official administrative structures 
presents problems when government has its own agenda, which 
may direct NGO activity away from the country's most urgent 
humanitarian needs.
* NGOs must consider whether working with rebel factions is
feasible; for example, is there potential for supporting 
basic service provision by rebel groups? By the same token, 
many governments are unwilling to allow NGOs to support 
indigenous structures as this may threaten centralised 
government power.
* NGOs need to make strategic decisions on the issue of
capacity-building. By co-ordinating their efforts, they may 
achieve a greater impact on government structures and 
institutions than by working autonomously.
* NGOs and others should examine the political and economic
context in which they work, to reach some understanding of 
why structures deteriorate. This should take into account 
trends in the global economy, donor politics and World Bank 
structural adjustment policies.
NGOs AND DONORS
NGOs are facing increasing pressure as inter-governmental 
agencies such as the World Bank retreat from operational 
work. NGOs are increasingly contracted to carry out the work 
of donor governments, which involves acceptance of donor 
conditionality and the reduction of NGO autonomy. There is 
concern that the few remaining independent NGOs will simply 
becoming local agents for donor governments as the price of 
expanding their activities and receiving funding.
* The large UK NGOs (SCF and Oxfam) are among the very few 
agencies with a secure independent funding base, and are 
therefore working in many unlikely situations. For example-, 
in Sudan, in the face of enormous donor resistance to the 
Sudanese government, SCF is working with the authorities - 
if very uneasily - in health service provision. Activities 
of this kind are necessary in countries which do not have 
the approval of the West, because in 1non-friendly 
countries' aid is restricted to the minimum. Even 
alternative uses of food aid, such as f ood-f or-work or 
monetised food aid, is withheld.
LOBBYING AND ADVOCACY
* NGOs have an important advocacy role, although the scope for 
lobbying is limited by the small number of independent NGOs 
that remain. They are well placed to (i) advise the UN and 
donors on questions relating to emergency relief, (ii) lobby 
governments over the enforcement of humanitarian law and 
(iii) alert the public to structural economic and 
political problems many African countries currently face. 
There is the potential for activity in this field to be 
expanded.
* A more constructive dialogue between NGOs and the World Bank 
is needed regarding the planning of programmes and 
assessment of their impact. There is, however, a widely held 
view that the Bank is impervious to criticism, so the impact 
of NGO information and research on Bank policy is 
questionable.
* Currently, the World Bank has u n c h a l l e n g e d  and
unchallengable influence in African countries, and many 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have been forced 
through, despite the private acknowledgement of some World 
Bank staff that SAPs may not be the most effective economic 
strategy. There is no "Court of Appeal", UN or otherwise, to
address the collective suffering of countries such as
Zimbabwe under SAPs. The lack of accountability at the 
global level of large donors such as the Bank should be
challenged by NGOs and others.
THE FUTURE FOR NGOs
* The future role of NGOs requires careful consideration, as 
Africa faces further political turmoil and ethnic conflict 
in the next decade. Donors and UN agencies have been slow to 
react to the long-term, structural crisis now facing 
Africa. Existing problems include the slow pace of 
industrialisation, rapid urbanisation, a stagnant formal 
economy, little diversification, and the impact of
Structural Adjustment Programmes. The IMF and World Bank do 
not recognise the existence of parallel economies, yet these 
are a vital part of the economic context in Africa, and 
their development is greatly affected by. SAPs.
NGO involvement in emergencies is currently dominated by 
food relief; this will continue until the international 
community chooses to address the wider economic and 
political problems facing Africa.
NGOs could play a key role in generating new approaches to 
the structural problems Africa currently faces. They should 
develop their capacity to undertake operational research and 
analysis to highlight the fundamental issues, and lobby 
among the internatinal community and democratic constituency 
in the West, for a more appropriate response, comensurate 
with the scale and urgency of the problem
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1
CONFLICT. FOOD AND FAMINE
REFLECTIONS ON STJB-SAHARAN AFRICA
REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN
Give justice to the weak and to the fatherless;
Maintain the rights of the afflicted and the destitute.
- Psalms 82:3
OVERVIEW
Food insecurity is endemic for many Sub-Saharan Africans and for 
a majority of SSA countries even in the absence of war or civil 
war. Armed violence at high levels afflicted at least nine 
(Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire) in 1991. Over the 1980s famine in the 
sense of massive loss of life basically caused by inadequate 
access to food has, in SSA, occurred only when both conditions 
afflicted a country. High levels of armed violence - whether 
from war, civil war or civil unrest/riots/risings - usually 
marked negative consequences for food production, procurement and 
distribution and commercial importation. Therefore, war or civil 
war is under present SSA conditions virtually a sufficient 
condition for famine - unless as in the case of Zimbabwean and 
Tanzanian support for Mozambique it basically takes the form of 
forces fighting in another country and of border defence. High 
levels of armed violence short of civil war and not greatly 
disrupting rural production or transport in a country with a 
physical food surplus do not necessarily lead to famine, e.g. 
South Africa; but if production and transport are affected they 
can and do lead to local famine conditions eg. Uganda, Zaire.
The number of war victims, either dying or suffering severe food 
insecurity, is very hard to quantify. Most war related deaths in 
SSA are not only not of combatants nor of civilians directly 
trapped in conflict, but also not famine victims in the normal 
sense of that term. They are of refugees and dislocated people 
fleeing from conflict or in refugee/dislocated person camps and 
resettlement areas. Most are infants, young children and aged 
persons. Their deaths are usually the result of the interaction 
of malnutrition, collapse of primary medical care and of access 
to pure water. In the best documented cases - Mozambique and 
Angola - a majority are under 5's; a pattern which probably 
characterises the Horn of Africa as well. The total number of
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war refugees and dislocated persons is unlikely to be below 25 
million persons as of 1992 - perhaps a fifth cross border
refugees and four-fifths internally displaced. A further 5 
million plus souls are pauperised living in their home districts 
but without the means or the context to pursue normal 
livelihoods. Over 1980/90 war related deaths in SSA probably are 
of the order of 5 million (1.5 million in Southern Africa and up 
to twice as many in the Horn with over 100,000 each in Chad, 
Uganda and Zaire).
THE BACKDROP OF NON-SUCCESS
The extreme vulnerability of most of SSA to any severe shock - 
whether drought, war, terms of trade deterioration or reductions 
in delivery of external assistance - is a product of economic 
non-success for most countries at least over 1980/85 and for many 
over much longer periods, including 1986/90. The peak SSA
output per capita year was 1979/80. For most of the 1980s SSA 
GDP/per capita and that of most countries declined. As noted, 
there are a number of economies which had records of unsuccess 
well before 1980 and/or which have shown little recovery (or a 
decline) in performance since 1985. Ethiopia - admittedly an 
extreme case - appears to have had declining output per capita in 
each five year period since GDP estimates were begun in the 1850s 
while Ghana had a trend decline from 1960 through 1983.
The food production record is even worse. It is doubtful that 
at SSA level per capita food production trends were equal to 
those of population from the late 1950s or early 1960s until - 
perhaps - the late 1980s. This remained true even in the 1970s 
when sharp effective domestic relative price swings against
export and industrial crops meant that more than all agricultural
output increase was in domestic foodstuffs (1.8% a year versus 
1.4% overall and negative for industrial and export crops.
The reason for this record are complex and their relative
importance subject to vehement debate. The results are much more 
evident:
a. the domestic food balance is - with a few exceptions -
precarious in normal years and disastrous in drought afflicted ones;
b. import capacity is increasingly inadequate to cover growing 
trend levels of food imports let alone sudden drought
(and/or war year) surges, while food aid has proven an
imperfect gap filler both as to timing and quantity;
c. high levels of debt and low levels of reserves have left no
leeway to buy time to ride out short or to adjust to longer term shocks;
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d. donor conditionality - especially at macro policy level - 
whatever its other virtues has not in practice been 
effective at raising food production adequately, reducing 
absolute poverty or providing survival and post war drought 
livelihood rehabilitation programmes while emergency relief 
focused on survival has been ill-coordinated with 
rehabilitation of livelihoods after the immediate disaster 
has passed.
True, part of the overall and food production non-success has 
been the consequence of war. Tentative calculations on partial 
data suggest both SSA GDP and food production growth might have 
been 2% a year higher in the absence of armed conflict. For some 
countries war has dominated results. The poorest sub-regional 
record over 1985/90 is that of the Horn (all except Djibouti war 
afflicted). However, the second worst sub-regional record is 
that of West Africa ( the least violent conflict ridden area) and 
the least bad Southern Africa (with over half the war related DGP 
loss). Therefore, other factors have contributed to worsening 
overall economic and food production performance and to 
increasing fragility.
A very exceptional (and in large part non-generalisable) case 
demonstrates this. Botswana has enjoyed a growth rate of output 
in real purchasing power terms of over 10% a year for over two 
decades as well as nearly parallel export growth. As a result a 
very low rate of domestic food production growth has been offset 
by growing (largely commercial) food imports. Employment 
creation has raised the number of households with at least one 
modern sector employee (in Botswana, i.e. excluding migrants) 
from 1 in 12 to over 1 in 2. Reserves and budgetary resources 
allow phased response to external shocks and offsetting measures 
for actual or potential absolutely poor households. Indeed 
part-time public works employment and supplementary food 
distribution via multiple channels probably more than offset the 
1980s multi-year drought's impact on poor rural household income. 
Very significant defence expenditure (successful in the sense 
that armed conflict on Botswana soil was very limited) reduced 
government reserves rather than civil expenditure. Botswana 
handled its resources prudently; developed programmes 
imaginatively and implemented them (in most cases efficiently), 
but without the record of overall economic success (largely based 
on diamond development and EEC quota beef prices) it would have 
had no capacity to demonstrate (or build up) its competence.
Therefore, any review of the economic, food supply and human 
consequences of war, needs to take into account the overall 
economic and food security trend of unsuccess, levels of weakness 
and resultant fragility in the face of shocks during the 1980s.
STRIFE & FOOD PRODUCTION
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The impact of armed conflict on food production depends on the 
intensity, tactics, location and duration of the conflict. In 
particular it depends on whether one or more parties 
systematically set out to destroy civil society and the 
possibility of normal production in all areas not stably 
controlled by them. It is because precisely such tactics have 
been central to Renamo and UNITA strategies that the Angolan and 
Mozambican crises have been so dire and because they have not 
figured in government strategy that some - by no means all - long 
Renamo or UNITA controlled areas have had limited output losses 
(albeit at the price of enforced provisioning of the rebel 
forces). Sudan, Ethiopia and Liberia have all suffered from 
similar - but apparently less generalised, or at least less 
effective - tactics.
Similarly, the location of armed conflict affects its impact on 
food production. The more limited the area and the less central 
to food production, the less the overall (though by no means 
necessarily the local) impact. Intensity may be less important 
than would be supposed. A relatively high intensity war on 
relatively fixed lines (as in parts of Eritrea) may not greatly 
affect output beyond a limited war zone. Similarly a brief, high 
intensity campaign targeted on military forces and positions 
(e.g. the Tanzanian counter-attack campaign to remove Amin) has 
relatively low impact. On the other hand, a moving campaign of 
low level attacks on farms, farmers and local gathering places 
(e.g. bus stops, clinics) creates fear and inability to pursue 
agricultural activity out of all proportion to its intensity - as 
currently exemplified in Mozambigue.
The duration of the conflict may result in some adjustment to the 
insecure context and partial recovery of output, e.g. Mozambican 
peasants living in Malawi but cultivating by day in Mozambique or 
staying in towns or relatively safe affected persons areas at 
night but rushing out to cultivate by day. However, the overall 
impact is likely to be negative as more and more barriers to 
production and more and more failed efforts arise.
Another factor is what the basic food crops are. Grain and 
livestock are most vulnerable; vegetables somewhat, and tree 
crops distinctly, less so and root crops (once planted) 
relatively safe. Cassava requires little cultivation, can be 
h a r v e s t e d  over an extended period, is to a d e g r e e  
self-propagating and cannot be destroyed except by digging up the 
roots - facts which have enabled scores of thousands of 
Mozambicans (and probably many Liberians) to survive. 
Harvestable maize burns readily and crops are radically reduced 
by lack of cultivation; livestock are easy to kill or drive away 
and need relatively continuous attention - facts which are 
killing thousands of Somalis (and probably have killed tens of 
thousands of Ethiopians).
IThe indirect effect of armed conflict on food production turns on 
the importance (or otherwise) of inputs and extension services. 
If these are important then their dislocation by conflict and by 
the deterioration of the import capacity and budgetary position 
of the country can have a severe negative impact. This is likely 
to be most severe for large farming units (unless they have their 
own defence units) and 'modern' medium scale farms and least for 
small farms producing largely for households self-provisioning.
FOOD PRODUCTION, WAR & FOOD SUPPLY
Food production is an input into effective access to food, but by 
no means the only one. Transport, storage, imports and 
purchasing power/transfer access are also crucial. Armed 
conflict is damaging to all.
Transport infrastructure and fleet are always prime targets of 
conflict. Transport routes become impassable (physically and/or 
in terms of security) in some cases and slow and risky in many 
more. Therefore, neither can food from secure areas with
surpluses be transported readily to conflict ravaged areas with 
deficits, nor can imports be moved to conflict zones or non-port 
cities speedily, reliably or cheaply. An additional drain is 
likely to result from the diversion of transport equipment from 
civilian to military uses.
Storage is also likely to be a war casualty at all levels below 
major town. On farm household stores are particularly at risk 
from marauders (including unfed government troops) and their loss 
is particularly damaging to household food security. Village and 
small town warehouses are often at risk as well. The result is 
not just loss of produced food and of storage capacity but also 
of a defensive centralisation of stocks which - combined with 
weakened transport - makes distribution to areas and household at 
risk much harder.
National food deficits can be reduced or closed by imports. 
Sustained, intense armed conflict is likely to erode foreign
exchange and budgetary capacity to import. On the supply side 
exports are likely to be reduced and government revenues eroded 
by slow or negative overall growth while on the demand side 
increasing defence budgets eat up both foreign exchange and
budget allocations.
True, food aid is objectively higher (relative to population) to 
most SSA counties with high levels of armed conflict or large 
numbers of refugees. As these are the ones with the highest 
profile extreme malnutrition or famine conditions that is not 
surprising. But food aid is not a dependable wav of closing a 
ood deficit - either as to timing or volume with the former 
tending to be lagged and the latter too low. Further, donors are
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frequently unwilling to accept the low efficiency (including 
’leakages') inevitable under war conditions and some clearly use 
approval or delivery of food aid in an attempt to influence 
conflict outcomes and/or to score prestige/influence points with 
governments or anti-government forces (vide pre-Nkomati 
Mozambique, the Sudan since 1989, Eritrea and Tigre in the first 
half of 1991) . the motives may be benign - to force 
reconciliation/compromise - but the results are usually appalling 
on the malnutrition/famine fronts and negligible on that of 
conflict reduction. In refugee host situations the food aid 
process usually works better unless the host is also a victim of 
internal armed conflict (e.g. Tazania Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe vs 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda).
Access - via earned income or transfers - is also eroded by war. 
The $150 billion probable 1980/90 loss of GDP in SSA resulting 
from war has radically reduced many rural households incomes via 
direct loss of production and of market access and secondary cash 
incomes opportunities and of many urban households through
decreasing employment (including meaningful self-employment) 
opportunities and falling real wages and 'informal' sector 
incomes. Therefore, physical availability of food is not enough 
to ensure access even at survival level.
That fact is most obvious for international refugees and 
internally displaced persons in camps. As a result most transfer 
assistance is to them in the form of food. While usually
inadequate in quantity., this does, except in the immediate
aftermath of upsurges in fighting - and fleeing - or of serious 
logistical bottlenecks, avert famine and in many cases extreme 
malnutrition. However, affected households (some dislocated but 
nominally resettled, others pauperised in place in devastated 
rural areas, and a third largely urban group pauperised by 
collapsing real incomes) are not limited to refugees and
dislocated persons. Their emergency is "quiet", low profile and 
rarely - if ever - dealt with effectively even when, as in at 
least urban Mozambique, significant priority and ingenuity has 
been deployed to address it.
Both the production and the other aspects of food insecurity are 
radically worsened when drought for flood) is superimposed on 
conflict. The debilitated logistic capacity is incapable of 
meeting sudden surges in demand. The information system is 
likely to have been weakened significantly (especially in rural 
areas) so that knowledge of impending disaster comes late and not 
very accurately. Food aid deliveries are hard to alter rapidly 
because of pipelines and procedures and donors are often 
singularly unwilling to believe pre-crisis information. In 1988
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a massive famine in Tete Province' of Mozambique was averted 
because data was better (also earlier but that gain was lost) 
than usual, the government set a high priority on averting a 
drought/war caused disaster, donors could act by diverting nearby 
existing flows (an unusual positive circumstance) and a few 
individuals who happened to be in key places were fully committed 
to getting grain in. That is the exception not the norm, 
although - under less war ravaged conditions - it may have been 
repeated in respect to the 1991 drought caused crop failure in 
Manica Province. Granted national food stocks dispersed to 
drought prone areas could buy time, but national stocks are 
casualties of violence as is their positioning beyond a handful 
of major cities.
FOOD, FAMINE, MALNUTRITION & DEATH
Most war related deaths in SSA arise from inadequate food supply. 
That is, of course, not new. It has been true of most, (not all) 
wars throughout history. However, famine is the extreme form of 
the inadequate food/death link and while the most visible is 
probably rarely the dominant one. In Mozambique and Angola 
perhaps 20% of war related deaths can be attributed to famine 
strictly defined. While the Ethiopian and Sudanese proportions 
may be higher they are - taking the 1980/90 decade - unlikely to 
be as high as half.
A major killer is malnutrition plus exhaustion in the course of, 
or just after, treks toward safety. This holds true whether or 
not there are violent hazards on the trip, e.g. Mozambicans 
seeking to reach displaced person camps when Renamo grip over 
routes out has been broken. Most of the victims are at the ends 
of the age spectrum - aged and young children.
However, the largest single lethal condition is the combination 
of inadequate access to food and to basic health services, plus 
pure water. Under those conditions a series of, in themselves 
minor, illnesses further weaken their victims leading directly or 
via a more serious (but under normal circumstances non-lethal. 
e.g. measles) disease to the grave. High levels of armed 
violence damage not merely access to food but also to rural and 
secondary town primary health care and to pure water. Physical 
damage, lack of transport and budgetary debilitation all play 
malign roles, but the worst results (under 5 health rates of the 
order of 300) have come in Mozambique and Angola where Renamo and 
(to a slightly lesser extent) UNITA specifically targeted health 
facilities, personnel and patients as well as rural and urban water supply works.
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In theory refugee and displaced persons programmes can address 
the primary health care and pure water problems as effectively 
as those of food supply. In practice this is not always 
practicable (camp environments with overcrowding and limited 
nearby pure water are always potentially lethal) and is often 
underfunded or hamstrung by absence of personnel. Exceptions,
e.g. some parts of Mozambique - occur when the government gives 
very high priority to primary health care (with an emphasis on 
vaccination/immunisation and on mother/child clinics) and to pure 
water supply, and has at least some personnel and institutional 
capacity to which donors and NGOs can relate (or complement).
WAR STRATEGY, FOOD SECURITY, FAMINE & MORTALITY
Governments do see food as an instrument of war both to win 
support and to strengthen supporters and per contra to demoralise 
opponents and weaken their resistance. However, undesirable the 
latter may be, it is standard practice vide the Allies' blockade 
of the Continental Powers in World War I, and of Germany and 
Japan in World War II, and the German attempts to starve out the 
United Kingdom by submarine operations in both wars. Nor is the 
moral case against some uses of food curtailment as unproblematic 
as it may seem - demoralised, ill-fed troops may surrender more 
readily, and workers under similar conditions contribute little 
to war production and support services. Xf these factors do 
bring an early end to armed conflict, the argument that they save 
lives is not self-evidently fraudulent.
Government and armed opposition force tactics in respect to food 
supply in conflict situations vary widely in SSA. Supplying ones 
own armed forces is a uniform (and understandable) priority. Its 
problem for civilian food security turns on how and from where 
that food is acquired. Food aid is (in principle) not available 
for uniformed forces albeit blind eyes are sometimes turned. But 
if the principle of not feeding uniformed personnel creates a 
situation of attempting to distribute food to dislocated people 
in the context of very hungry regular troops and local militia, 
optimistically expected to guard it, the troops and militiamen 
will inevitably take the food with greater or less violence — as 
happened, e.g. in Zambesia province of Mozambique in 1991. The 
optimal sources of armed forces supplies are external or domestic 
cash procurement, but these are frequently beyond the means of 
financially imploded conflict riven states both on the government 
and on the armed opposition side. The likely result is official 
or unofficial levies in kind collected with greater or less 
degrees of violence, and likely to worsen the civilian 
population's food position severely.
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In general, governments and armed opposition bodies express at 
least verbal commitment to feeding the civilian population in 
areas they control. But the degree of priority and the capacity 
to act vary. Renamo, for example, has never shown any concern 
that civilians in areas it controls eat except insofar as this is 
a necessary by-product of forcing them to grow crops to 
provision Renamo bands - a situation pertaining in some, but not 
all of the areas it controls and not in contested are<|s. The 
government of Mozambique gives food access for civilians top 
priority, but has so little operational and financial capacity as 
to be dependent for results on donors whose commitment is not 
always of the same order and whose approaches are not necessarily 
optimal. Angola has had more foreign exchange, high and medium 
level personnel capacity and own finance than Mozambique but, in 
practice, has a lesser food mobilisation and distribution 
capacity which suggests a lower (although not negligible) level 
of prioritisation. None of the sides in the Liberian civil war 
appeared to pay any serious attention to the ways and means of 
providing their own civilian supporters with food, and in Somalia 
only the fraction controlling the northwest (ex-Somaliland) 
appears to give it high priority backed by some organising 
capacity and (relative) security for supplies and distributors.
The attitudes toward food access of civilians under the 'other 
sides' control very tremendously. UNITA and Renamo have 
systematically sought to prevent food production in contested 
areas and to disrupt it in government controlled ones 
(particularly by seeding fields with mines in the former case and 
terror raids in the latter). Neither the Angolan or the 
Mozambican government has had any parallel strategy of disrupting 
civilian farmers beyond the reach of their civil governance. 
However, the position of peasant households in contested areas is 
an inevitable casualty of fighting, literally in their fields, to 
their doorsteps. The main obstacle to third party delivery of 
food aid to civilians in rebel force zones of control has in 
these cases largely been based on the fairly evident fact that, 
once distributed, food is fairly readily recollected by the 
military (or collected directly by military personnel out of 
uniform). the Eritrean nationalist forces did give priority to 
averting starvation of Eritrean civilians in the Asmara pocket in 
1990/91 despite the fact that it fed the Ethiopian garrison too, 
albeit it did so only once the Mengistu regime's military 
position in Eritrea had become terminally untenable. In the 
Sudan neither the Khartoum regime nor Garang's forces have been 
willing to allow even handed international food distribution 
except when averting civilian starvation and/or military 
mainourishment in the areas they controlled outweighed their 
aversion to letting anyone on the other side of the lines eat. 
he Ethiopian case appears mixed - a war of starvation was waged 
■ hlessly and systematically in Tigre against supposed (and 
quite o ten actual) TULF supporters but that does not appear to 
have been done - at least systematically and coherently -elsewhere.
- 10 -
Almost all parties to armed conflict view disrupting or 
interdicting food supplies to enemy armed forces as desirable. 
The difference is in how much damage to production and civilian 
supply they are willing to cause to ensure that result and in the 
actual conditions on the ground. UNITA, Renamo and the Eritrean 
nationalists have given priority to starving out their opponent's 
garrisons - with uneven and limited results - but the Eritreans 
blinked when a large Eritrean civilian population threatened to 
be fellow victims. Mozambique and Angola have had a few 
occasions when they were besieging encircled rebellious forces 
and have not attacked food growing capacity in rebel areas to any 
significant extent. In the Sudan both Khartoum and Garang have 
systematically used starvation tactics quite indiscriminately 
including 'enlisting' militias whose chief commitments appear to 
be to looting, enslaving, burning and killing.
Angola and UNITA did agree to an internationally operated food 
relief convoy system in the drought stricken southern provinces 
in 1990/92 but its operation raised continuing problems and UNITA 
w o u l d  not agree to any n a t i o n w i d e  paral l e l  b e c a u s e  
besieging/starving out towns was central to its strategy. In 
Mozambique by cutting down on external food flows to Renamo and 
by radically reducing the areas in which it controls peasants, 
the government has reduced Renamo forces' access to food to the 
point where for many bands hunger is the main enemy and getting 
food the overriding concern. The results for civilians are not 
unproblematic - raids on homesteads (or across borders into 
Zambia) to steal food do kill people even though the need to 
concentrate on them saps morale (increasing the effectiveness of 
amnesty programmes) and reduces military effectiveness. The 
government - not surprisingly nor unreasonably in this context - 
would insist on civilian food relief to Renamo controlled areas 
being internationally monitored to user level to prevent it in 
fact provisioning Renamo fighters rather than reducing civilian 
malnutrition. It the precedent of the functioning provision of 
immunisation and vaccination supplies (nominally for children and 
mother/mothers-to-be, but dominated by tetanus vaccine which 
suggests military use) is any guide, Renamo would not agree to 
such supervision.
Another strategic/tactical element affecting food access relates 
to policy in respect to civilian residents of contested areas. 
Unfortunately, evaluation of this depends on motives as well as 
on actions. Ethiopia under Mengistu clearly resettled Tigreans 
to weaken TULF (even though an ecological/food security case for 
some resettlement did exist) . Either its logistical capacity, or 
its low priority to Tigrean lives, meant that the death toll was 
high (as it usually is for large population movements undertaken 
under conditions of violent conflict vide the record
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of the Nansen office after World War I or the Punjab after the 
partition of the former Indian Empire). In Mozambique the 
government perceives rural households in contested zones to be at 
very high risk. So long as the zones were Renamo controlled the 
peasants were at less risk as Renmo exploited them to provide 
food, porters and bedmates but usually did not kill them on the 
scale of terror raid victims in contested areas, while the 
government did not wage war against civilians. Therefore, 
following offensives it has frequently wished to move civilian 
populations temporarily to displaced person camps, until security 
is restored. This policy has endangered their food security 
because donors have been unable or unwilling to cooperate with it 
(and the armed forces, not surprisingly, provide little advance 
information on additional numbers likely to be needing food where 
and when). In 1991 in Zambesia totally inadequate food supplies 
were provided and intense donor pressure was put on Mozambique to 
send these newly displaced persons home. As this was then done 
late in the year, of mixed but generally unfavourable climatic 
conditions, the results have been disastrous in terms of 
mini-famine and malnutrition related deaths.
POSTLUDE ~ THE RESULTS OF CONFLICT LIVE LONG
A warning is needed lest an analysis of the cost of armed 
conflict to food insecurity and death cause more insecurity and 
death after the conflict itself has ceased or significantly 
abated. Many of the results of armed conflict live on long 
after the conflict itself is over. Even in Europe in 1945/47 
food insecurity, local famine, malnutrition and death resulting 
from World War II abated slowly despite massive relief and 
rehabilitation efforts.
Broken infrastructure, devastated budgets, burn-out medical and 
educational facilities, blasted water supplies and decimated as 
well as scattered medical-education-extension cadres do not rise 
like the phoenix the moment the conflict ends. They take funds, 
personnel, institutional recapacitation, construction capacity 
and time. Particularly in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia 
and Somalia it will be a long, hard painfully slow slog as it is 
now in Uganda and Chad.
An appalling danger exists. This is that emergency aid to 
refugees and dislocated persons will be scaled down before they 
can re-establish their livelihoods and that emergency support 
logistic networks will be dismantled rather than converted to 
rehabilitation. If that happens then food insecurity, 
malnutrition, famine and death will rise in Angola, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and will not abate in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia or Eritrea.
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This grim scenario is made more likely by several institutional 
environmental facts:
1. Donors become very weary of protracted emergency aid 
programmes (even if the victims become wearier, assuming 
they survive).
2. Emergency and development aid fall - in many agencies - into 
t w o  s e p a r a t e  c o m p a r t m e n t s  w i t h  
resettlement/demobilisation/livelihood rehabilitation 
assistance falling between them and, often, out of sight 
(and of significant funding).
3. The coordinator of many emergency programmes - UNDP - does 
not appear to have coherent draft rehabilitation 
programme/emergency network conversion plans.
4. UNHCR has a more coherent vision and some return/livelihood 
rehabilitation experience but is badly underfunded and at 
present has no mandate in respect to internally displaced or 
pauperised in-place households.
5. Few governments have given serious attention (or planning 
priority) to rehabilitation after conflict - understandable 
during the peak conflict demands but potentially deadly 
later.
6. Those which have given such priority (notably mozambique and 
Eritrea have had limited capacity to articulate, funds to 
launch test projects, or success at generating serious 
operationally oriented donor support infused with any sense 
of urgency.
Unless action is taken rapidly to close the gap and change these 
institutional realities the peace dividend in at least 
Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Sudan will be aid in corpses.
Intellectually livelihood rehabilitation programmes (especially 
the rural 80% or more) are relatively easy to devise:
a. effective access to inputs including tools to re-clear bush 
and rebuild houses as well as to plant and till;
b. basic household supplies (e.g. one or more buckets, so water 
collection is practicable) and inputs for fishing and - 
where central to livelihoods - livestock (i.e. core herds) 
as well as for crops;
c. access to markets and - especially in early years - 
non-agricultural cash incomes;
- 13 -
d. repair/reconstruction of basic rural works (transport, 
storage, health, education, water, administration buildings) 
preferably by seasonal, labour intensive methods  
contributing to meeting the access to cash income 
requirement;
e. food until a semi-normal harvest can be brought in (rarely 
less than 9 months, often up to 2 0 and - if a drought or 
flood wrecks the first harvest - sometimes over 30 months);
f. Restoration of basic services (primary health care, primary 
and adult education, pure water supply, relevant 
agricultural extension);
g. Delivery of all of the above points accessible to rural 
residents (perhaps 1,500 in Mozambique versus 600 to 750 
survival assistance centres.
Articulation is more difficult especially because it requires 
data available - at least to a large extent - only by 
participatory approaches which have, not surprisingly, not 
flourished in strife ridden areas. Institutional restructuring 
is potentially even harder because of lack of vision and 
institutional personnel's intertial attraction to status quo 
procedures and structures. Personnel constraints will require 
both mobilisation and prioritisation, but also innovation and 
using alternative approaches to avoid programmatic collapse. But 
the greatest obstacle as of 1992 is that there is no evident 
commitment of donors to convert maximum recent emergency survival 
level funding to livelihood rehabilitation for say - five years; 
to recognise the urgency of such a shift; or to accept domestic 
government and civil society leadership in programme design and 
articulation. Arguably, international NGOs are more attuned to 
rehabilitation than most external (and some African) governments, 
but usually by doing their own thing in their own functional 
and/or geographic corner (and often in very different ways) not 
by a coordinated mobilisation of domestic government/civil 
society and external donor resources to meet the overall challenge.
ANNEX 2
MOTES OF THE PARALLEL ECONOMY. CONFLICT & DISASTER RELIEF
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
MARK DUFFIELD
Reginald Green's paper gives a good overview of the social and 
economic costs of conflict in Africa. In acting as a discussant 
for this paper, I will not attempt to summarise the enormity of 
these costs which, in any case, through the pioneering work of 
Green and others, are now gaining wider acceptance and 
familiarity.
To complement Green's paper, these notes look at the causes of 
conflict. More particularly, they are concerned to relate con­
flict to an underlying political economy. The international 
backdrop to this analysis is the dis-engagement of Western 
political and economic interest after an era of globally unprece­
dented involvement.
VIEWS ON THE CAUSE OF CONFLICT
In these notes, the term 'conflict' is loosely understood to mean 
international conflict.
There are two main positions. Firstly, a more recent view which 
sees conflict as resulting from economic necessity. Adverse 
enviro-economic conditions have led to a shrinking resource base 
which, in turn, promotes inter-group conflict.
Secondly, an older 'Third Worldist' view premised upon the 
struggle for political and social rights. Conflict is located in 
the dynamic linking the corrupt 'state' and the just 'people'.
Whilst these views can be useful in explaining certain aspects of 
conflict, they do not get to the root of the issue. To a certain 
extent, they both under-estimate what could be called the struc­
tural nature of conflict in Africa. Given an appropriate aid 
package, or a just political settlement, or both, these posi­
tions suggest that conflict will disappear. Experience suggests 
that this cannot be simply assumed and may, in fact, be more dif­
ficult to realise.
1. Conflict, food and famine: reflections on sub-saharanAfrica.
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THE PARALLEL ECONOMY
That Africa is facing an unprecedented economic crisis and that 
nearly four decades of developmental aid has had minimal results 
is well accepted.
The concept of coping strategies has recently been developed to 
think through how the most vulnerable groups have so far survived 
this crisis. The principle underlying this concept, that is, 
that people are not passive victims but take a pro-active 
response to dearth, should now be extended to more fortunate and 
well established groups, indeed, to economies as a whole. In 
other words, how A/xrican societies have managed to continue, 
despite dire conventional economic indicators or even apparent 
implosion, suggests that economies themselves may have found the 
means to cope with what are otherwise impossible conditions.
Just as the idea of coping strategies has revived a sociological 
interest in how vulnerable people actually live, so the notion of 
a parallel or hidden economy relates to economies as they ac­
tually exist, not to a conventional model of what they should be.
KEY PROPOSITION
Encouraged, since the 1970s, by questionable neo-liberal aid 
policies into a reliance on raw material production, the formal 
economy has declined. In response, the parallel economy has 
grown increasingly important. So important, in fact, that frag­
mentation and conflict involving its operation and control has 
resulted.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE PARALLEL ECONOMY
The parallel economy, which has similarities with the second 
economy in the former Eastern bloc, has origins in the domination 
of the state. The developmental prominence given to the post­
colonial state, and then in the various attempts to establish 
planned economies, were a big impetus to the development of a hidden economy.
The uneven introduction of restrictions and tariff barriers, for 
example, created a range of comparative advantage in relation to 
different commodities between different countries. It promoted 
the emergence of pan-African smuggling networks (e.g. animal 
products, hard currency, precious metals, etc.) of increasing 
complexity and growing significance in terms of their worth in 
relation to stagnating official GNPs. At the same time, conven­
tional indicators continued to highlight an apparent lack of inter-state trade.
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The corruption of official position is an essential requirement 
both to facilitate such trade and to link it to domestic parallel 
activity. In the Horn region,' for example, a black market in 
hard currency sustained by the earnings of migrant workers in the 
Gulf has been important in the development of the regional hidden 
economy.
In the case of Sudan and Somalia, it has been suggested that if 
parallel activities were taken into account, the declared GNPs of 
these countries would have to be revised upwards by 4 0% or more.
DISASTER AS A SOURCE OF PARALLEL PROFIT
During the 1980s, refugees and the internally displaced became 
part of the hidden system in terms of the various means which 
have emerged to divert or recycle relief aid. As large-scale 
relief operations began to develop, the pegging of official ex­
change rates at an inflated level became a common ploy whereby 
the state was able to profit from disaster.
That disaster can be a source of profit for some is an important 
aspect of hidden activity which, although known during the 
Sahelian famine of the 1970s, is now gaining wider currency.
Conventional wisdom, for example, has pointed out that livestock 
prices fall in times of reduced food supply. During the mid- 
1980s, the response to this phenomenon was to call for early 
warning systems, food buffer stocks and other forms of interven­
tion.
What was overlooked, to the eventual cost of such strategies, was 
that famine also has its winners. In the example given, as live­
stock prices fall, those middlemen and merchants able to buy at 
bargain prices gain from the situation. Since people are also 
powerful local actors, this comparative advantage can easily 
crystallise into practices that undermine effective relief and 
deliberately promote dearth.
In other words, the operation of the parallel economy has a 
direct bearing on the question of food security.
From this perspective, famine can become an occasion for asset 
stripping whereby the powerful gain from the vulnerable. Since 
this profit is often extra-legal, if assets are not consumed 
directly, the hidden circuits of parallel exchange provide an ap­
propriate means of valorization. A good example here is the de­
stocking by Arab militia groups of the Dinka of northern Bahral Ghazal c. 1984-1988.
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AN EXAMPLE OF COMPLEX PARALLEL EXCHANGE
t
tParallel economies are complex and link both national and inter­
national circuits of exchange. In 1988, for example, illegal 
dollar remittances from Sudanese migrant workers were finding 
their way across the war zone of southern Sudan and travelling 
beyond.
Dollars traded on the merchant controlled parallel market in 
Khartoum, through links with the military, were flown by military 
transport to the besieged and encircled town of Juba. From here 
they would be taken by periodic military convoy to the Ugandan 
border. Sudanese merchants would then make their way into north­
ern Zaire where dollars were traded for gold and coffee offered 
by Zairian, Ugandan and Kenyan merchants. The exchange rates 
used reflected fluctuations in the world price for these com­
modities .
Gold, coffee and other goods were transported to the border and j 
taken back to Juba, again by military convoy. The public reason 
for these convoys was to move relief food. The fact that mer­
chant goods always took priority, not only supported the smug­
gling network, it artificially sustained dearth in Juba to the 
additional benefit of merchants and military entrepreneurs. From 
Juba, the parallel commodities were flown by military transport, 
the only means available, to Khartoum for onward exchange.
This example indicates the extent and sophistication of such 
markets. An extensive circuit of exchange of this kind not only 
brings together a whole range of actors and bit players across 
international boundaries, at several points, at least, it articu­
lates with the deliberate promotion of food insecurity for gain.
The parallel economies of Africa are comparable with the narcotic 
economies of South America.
CONFLICT AND THE PARALLEL ECONOMY
Within the framework of semi-subsistence, the physical survival : 
of an ethnically defined group is synonymous with its political 
survival. Moreover, the building blocs of the parallel economy, 
its strategic resources, lines of communication, and so on, are 
often in the hands of such groups. As the formal economy ' 
declines, the alternative means of survival are reduced,
parallel activities become more important and extreme.
Since groups dominating the state can also control key aspects of 
the parallel economy, the contradictions inherent within the hid­
den system can take a number of appearances. These range from 
low intensity inter-group conflict, to antagonisms between groups 
and the state, as well as within the state itself . Since paral
- 5 -
lei activities are usually extra-legal, they are prone to the use 
of force as, for example, in the promotion of food insecurity and 
asset stripping. Such activities can become the mechanisms 
through which internal war is fought. Indeed, the logic of in­
ternal war necessitates either controlling or destroying 
strategic elements of the resource infrastructure.
The linking of physical and political survival, means that the 
use force frequently takes the appearance of gross human rights 
violations and attempts at cultural annihilation.
The significance of the parallel economy in Somalia, for example, 
was first documented over a decade ago. Even then, in what now 
appear as prophetic terms, its operation was predicted to lead to 
chaos.
Unless an attempt is made to relate conflict to an underlying 
political economy, many current developments in Africa appear 
non-explicable. At worst, as in the case of Somalia, the popular 
media casts such events as simply the work of mindless thugs.
NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Due to the operation of the parallel economy, conventional aid, 
unless of a magnitude hitherto not seen in Africa, will not 
automatically reduce conflict.
Aid, moreover, is not enough. If one takes, for example, the es­
timated private savings held by Sudanese abroad, Sudan is, poten­
tially, modestly well off. That wealth which does exist in the 
parallel economy will not be put to the public good unless a 
process of political renewal creates the confidence and struc­
tures necessary to do so.
In some countries, this process has begun.
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The African crisis developed during the Cold War. Although hopes 
existed that its end would signal a general reconciliation, apart 
from on or two exceptions, this has not yet happened. As the 
mists of the Cold War have cleared it has tended that conflict, 
rather than an external construct, has a local dynamic.
2• Although this model has been developed in relation to 
Africa, developments in parts of Easter Europe and CIS have 
a similarity.
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STRUCTURAL DECLINE IN WESTERN AID
In the last analysis, Western aid has always been (and always 
will be) a political tool. The developmental impact of the rela­
tively limited amounts of Western aid received by Africa has been 
minimal. On the other hand, examples of unpopular, sectarian 
regimes, propped up for years by Western assistance are legion. 
The collapse of the Cold War has changed this situation.
Evidence suggests that aid to Africa has begun to decline and, 
lacking the political rationale of super-power confrontation, 
this trend can be expected to continue.
It should be noted that to reduce state subsidy in this way will 
possibly intensify the search for parallel profits.
CONDITIONALITY AND DISASTER RELIEF
The pattern of Western aid flow has been in a process of trans­
formation since the mid-1970s. There are two important develop­
ments. Firstly, the linking of the continuation of development 
aid, although not disaster relief, to the need for good gover­
nance. Secondly, from this period, an increasing proportion of 
official aid was redirected away from the state toward NGOs.
By the end of the 1970s, the era of conditionality, initially in 
relation to structural adjustment, was underway.
Apart from political considerations, however, conditionality can 
be seen as a policy response to the fact that the Western 
economies have to enter a period of relative decline. As aid 
levels stagnate, the criteria for receiving aid become increas­
ingly strict.
DISASTER RELIEF & THE DONOR/NGO SAFETY NET
By the mid-1980s, as the crisis in Africa deepened, western aid 
had begun to assume a neo-liberal two-tier structure.
Structural adjustment programmes were aimed at market reform. At 
the same time, a targeted donor/NGO safety net system had begun 
to take shape in the disaster prone countries. As relief sub­
contractors, NGOs are essential implementing agents within the safety net system.
Whilst developmental aid had been reduced or cut in some cases, 
until the end of the 1980s Western donors remained formally com­
mitted to supplying humanitarian assistance through the donor/NGo system.
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PARALLEL ACTIVITY & THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
By the end of the 1980s, the major technical limitations of the 
safety net system had become increasingly known, at least to the 
NGOs. This realisation, however, tended to be obscured by the 
growing problem of gaining access to the victims of famine or 
conflict. Just as parallel networks were capable of promoting 
dearth they were equally effective in undermining or stopping 
relief programmes. Conditionality began to assume the appearance 
of confrontation.
THE REFORM OF THE UN
From the mid-1980s, beginning with the emergence of NGO led 
across border relief operations, the problem of access led to in­
stitutional responses which started to challenge the foundation 
of the post-Second World War international settlement: the in­
violability of sovereignty. By the end of the decade, the ap­
plicability of the Geneva Conventions to internal conflict, the 
relevance of the UN mandates, and so on, had all been called in 
to serious question.
The reform of the UN had been placed firmly on the agenda.
The events of 1989 in eastern Europe accelerated this process. It 
was the Gulf war, however, which brought the question of the 
reform of the international regulatory system into the public 
realm.
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW STRATEGIC BALANCE
The collapse of the Cold War has created the need to establish a 
new international strategic balance. The post-Second World War 
settlement was based on the principle that external peace took 
precedence over internal justice, hence the central place af­
forded sovereignty.
Current debate in the West has, selectively, reversed these 
priorities. The leading G7 industrialised nations, for example, 
following the experience of the Kurdish relief operation, have 
indicated that sovereignty is no longer and excuse for denying 
relief assistance. Moreover, that the UN should streamline and 
improve its disaster relief capability.
These moves have been supported by the NGO community.
China opposes this trend. It supported the Gulf War 
because of Iraq's violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty.
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An important feature of these recent developments is that they 
have given a new dimension to conditionality. The collapse of 
the planned economies have added to those structural factors 
promoting complex/political disasters. At the same time, 
however, the availability of aid is stagnating. The result is 
that disaster relief, itself, has become conditional.
Raising donor support for African disasters has never been easy. 
In the last couple of years it has become more difficult. One 
can expect this trend to continue. The paradox is that continu­
ing problems of access and human rights abuse, rather than 
provide a spur for intervention, appears to be having the ap­
posite effect. That is of inducing 'donor fatigue'.
DISASTER RELIEF AS FOREIGN POLICY
Donors have realised that, in the more interventionist climate, 
high profile relief work can bring political dividends. Not in 
Africa however.
The donor/NGO relief contracting system, which was developed in 
Africa, has proven capable of international projection. In Iraq, 
for example, the donor/GNO relief system is part of the con­
ditionality package ranged against Saddam Hussain. Whilst the 
Western donors are not prepared to support a major economic aid 
programme, the recent CIS relief as a means of cushioning price 
liberalisation. It is toward CIS and Eastern Europe, moreover, 
that Western political interests have dictated a redirecting of 
relief aid.
Unlike Africa, over the past, it has not been difficult to raise 
funds for these recent ventures.
THE ISSUES OF THE 1980s
The above analysis should suggest that decreased aid, although of 
limited impact in the past, could further increase the importance 
of the parallel economy and hence instability, The following 
measures would seem appropriate.
a) The need to keep the situation in Africa on the donor 
agenda. Especially, the need for increased and more equi­
table assistance.
b) To support the process of reform within the UN and, 
importantly, to ensure that reform creates structures which 
are even-handed and able to properly assist the victims of conflict.
CONDITIONALITY & DISASTER RELIEF
To support the emergence of democratic movements in Africa 
and to establish linkages between them and the process of international reform.
ANNEX 3
TYPES OF WARFARE AND FAMINE IN THE HORN: 
COMMENTS ON JOHN RYLE'S PAPER
ALEX DE WAAL
I would like to augment John's paper by drawing attention to some 
aspects of the current situation in southern Sudan that have 
augurs for the future, and parallels with other conflicts in the 
Horn of Africa, particularly parts of southern Ethiopia and 
Somalia.
To start with, I will try to draw a distinction —  very rough and 
ready —  between three types of military strategy.
(1) Conventional counter-insurgency strategy, for instance as 
practised by the Ethiopian army under Colonel Mengistu. 
This involves using large numbers of formally conscripted 
soldiers within a regular force, employed in conjunction 
with mechanised forces and air power, etc. It also usually 
includes the systematic enforcement of counter-insurgency 
techniques developed by northern armies, such as the US, the 
Soviets and France, which may include population relocation 
in protected zones and the systematic control of movement 
and trade.
(2) "Irregular" counter-insurgency, that employs non-regular 
military forces as an adjunct to conventional forces. These 
non-regular forces may be militia or paramilitary groups or­
ganised and armed by the government, or may be self-armed 
groups acting in co-ordination with the government. The 
classic example of this is the "militia strategy" employed 
by successive Sudanese governments during the 1980s, which 
led to the sponsoring of groups such as the Murahaliin 
described in John's account of northern Bahr el Ghazal. 
These militias are partly free of central control and their 
use has attendant dangers; they are also usually not paid, 
and must raid and loot in order to provision themselves.
(3) "Anarchy" or "chaos". There is in fact no such thing as 
pure anarchy; anarchy has structure. This will be il­
lustrated with reference to Mogadishu below. What is here 
glossed as "anarchy" is the contending of different armed 
groups which fail to exercise any recognisable form of 
governmental control over territory or population. Such 
groups may have aspirations to government and legitimacy, 
but these aspirations are usually far removed from their ac­
tual actions, which are typically highly undisciplined.
1
IThey manifest the worst features of militia wars: lack of 
centralised control, and the need to fight to eat. In addi­
tion, they may be highly fissiparous.
To a certain extent, insurgency and counter-insurgency strategies 
mirror one another. The highly centralised and disciplined in­
surgencies of the EPLF and TPLF were both part cause and part 
consequence of the conventional counter-insurgency strategy of 
the Ethiopian army; the ethnic militia style of the SPLA had a 
similar relation to the Sudan government's militia policy.
My central contention is that we are witnessing a secular decline 
in the level and sophistication of military activity in the Horn 
of Africa —  and possibly in Africa in general. Governments are 
moving from strategy one towards strategy two, and strategy two 
leads directly to situation three, unless arrested by sustained 
political, economic and diplomatic action. There are of course 
exceptions to this trend: the recent rearming of the Sudanese
army is a case in point. However, I think the general rule 
holds. The most striking example is the accelerated transition 
in Somalia from conventional counter-insurgency in the north in 
1988, through irregular counter-insurgency based on clan militias 
during 1988-90, to anarchy in 1991-2. I fear that we may be 
seeing something similar in southern Sudan with the split in the 
SPLA and its likely severe military defeats over the coming 
months. In Ethiopia, the near-anarchy in parts of the east and 
south appears fortunately to be matched by a political commitment 
within the government to seek non-violent solutions to the under­
lying conflicts.
Anarchy is structured. This can be seen most clearly by looking 
at the current paradigm of anarchy: Mogadishu. This may unfor­
tunately be a model for what is likely to happen elsewhere, and 
so deserves scrutiny.
The conflict in Mogadishu operates at four main levels:
(1) The political level; the conflict of political agendas be­
tween Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid. In 
some ways this political conflict is superficial, as there 
are no ideological differences to speak of. However, this 
is the level at which most diplomacy operates, and the level 
at which the political-military leaders and other 
politicised Somalis understand and articulate the conflict; 
for that reason alone it is very important. Sadly, interna­
tional diplomatic efforts have concentrated almost ex­
clusively on this agenda, which has contributed to their 
failure-to date.
(2) A commercial level. Most of the politicians are 
businessmen; most have lost part or all of their businesses 
in the war. Under such conditions, the only realistic
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prospects for future commercial gain flow from holding 
governmental office. Holding office is, literally, a 
licence to print money; governments also receive foreign aid 
and can dispense contracts. This is why the symbols of 
"legitimacy” and "sovereignty" are so important, even though 
the country is in ruins: they are the key to making money on 
the parallel market. This is also why, despite the fact 
that Ali Mahdi controls only a few square kilometres of 
northern Mogadishu, his government is the largest in Africa, 
if not the world, containing 83 ministers.
(3) A clan level. The war has taken on an ethnic element that, 
once started, is almost impossible to stop. For ordinary 
Somalis, perhaps the most important reality about the con­
flict in Mogadishu is that Ali Mahdi has the Abgal and the 
Murasade, and the Aidid has the Habr Gidir; and that all 
Hawiye are opposed to the Darod.
(4) A basic economic level. There is no formal employment in 
Mogadishu and precious little informal employment. None of 
the soldiers are paid. To eat, they must steal food, or 
steal things to buy to sell food. This same lack of 
economic opportunities contributes to widespread banditry, 
consisting of both individual looters and thieves stealing 
for themselves, and organised gangs looting for profit, 
sometimes organised by powerful merchants with import/export 
interests.
This analysis reinforces many of the points made by Mark Duffield 
about the importance of the parallel economy in times of con­
flict. Struggle for control over the arteries of the parallel 
economy is itself one cause of the escalating violence, and as 
the formal economic and political structures disintegrate, it is 
only the parallel economy that survives.
All forms of warfare in the Horn have contributed to famine. The 
conventional strategies of the former Ethiopian government were 
instrumental in creating the repeated famines in that country. 
The irregular counter-insurgency of the Sudan government's 
militia strategy created a rather different form of famine in 
southern Sudan during 1986-9, and the anarchy in southern Somalia 
is creating a different form of famine again.
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ANNEX 4
FOOD & FAMINE - TOOLS OF WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE
ALEX VINES
INTRODUCTION
Mozambique is a fertile country. It should not have difficulty 
in feeding itself; indeed it should be a net exporter of food 
stuffs. But in the famine of 1983/4 in the south-central areas 
of the country 100,000 died according to rough estimates. Since 
then food security has become an increasing nightmare for the 
country.
A second major famine hit Mozambique in 1987, on this occasion in 
Zambezia province, partly as a result of war. In 1992 the 
spectre of a third serious famine looms over the country. In a 
country where food security is characterised by a nearly complete 
destruction of food self-sufficiency of the rural population (5 
million) and a 90% dependency on marketed and relief cereal 
needs. 1992 will be yet another chapter of disaster for the 
long-suffering peasantry. Millions of Mozambicans are now de­
pendent on internationally-donated relief supplies.
THE CURRENT CRISIS
According to a Mozambican government statement earlier this 
month, the whole of the country, south of the Zambezi river, is 
now seriously affected by drought. Throughout the south and 
centre of the country the rains have been late (delaying sowing 
between one and two months) , and even now are extremely ir­
regular.
Rainfall in the six affected provinces has been between 3 0% and 
70% less than normal. The situation is made worse by tempera­
tures being higher than normal. It now seems that all grain 
needs in these six provinces will have to come from food aid. 
Total production in the country in 1992 is expected to reach only
400,000 tonnes, about 25% of total needs.
This new crisis comes at a bad time for the government. It is 
already suffering from a food deficit in aid pledged to it by 
donors between May 1, 1991 and April 1992 - some 400,000 tonnes
of grain short. The government had requested 835,000 tonnes of 
grain and 151,000 tonnes of other foodstuffs to feed about 1.8 
million displaced people and returning refugees, and the 6 mil­
lion people who depend on the normal commercial network for their 
food. Because of the 1992 drought, emergency food aid may need 
to feed an additional one million people.
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Even more aid will be required if a cease-fire is signed in the 
next 12 months. Food aid will be needed to feed returning Mozam­
bican refugees from neighbouring countries as they start reset­
tling into devastated rural areas.
In protocol No. 3, signed in Rome, on March 12th, both the 
government and Renamo "undertake to co-operate in the repatria­
tion and re-integration in the national territory of Mozambican 
refugees and displaced people". Talks between the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the government began on 
March 20th, to discuss more seriously the practicalities involved
(1) •
Yet, although climatic adversity has played an important role in 
this disaster, a main reason for prolonged food dependency is the 
war. This paper will, therefore, focus on food security as an 
internal tool of war in Mozambique. The "conspiracy of inter­
ests" of international NGOs in Mozambique, and whether they con­
sciously worked to "weaken, erode and by-pass the state", is left 
to Joseph Hanlon, the expert and author on the subject, to dis­
cuss further at this meeting (2).
GOVERNMENT
There is little direct evidence that the government has 
deliberately pursued a policy of creating famine. However, 
famine is in part a direct and foreseeable consequence of the 
Forcas Armadas Mozambicana1s (FAM) attempts to control the 
civilian population. FAM has forcibly relocated rural popula­
tions in areas suspected of giving the rebels support. A govern­
ment officer explains (3) :
"We do move people into protected zones. It is for 
their safety. Otherwise the bandits would make them 
feed them. In remote areas
we then destroy the fields - so that the bandits will 
not become fat".
A peasant farmer from Mabote in 1990 gives a different perspec­
tive:
"They say as well that they are regrouping us to 
protect us, but isn't it rather to hide themselves be­
hind us during attacks?
So we are afraid of all men we come across". (4)
The government strategy has centred on protected villages and, 
more recently, on moving people to district centres and accom­
modation camps (between 1986/1988, 466 such centres were set up)
for deslocados. Many of these are zones of government control in
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a sea of insurgency. Without international aid they could not be 
maintained. Access to international food relief is
one of the government's greatest assets. The result of govern­
ment relocations and the security situation is that local popula­
tions, deprived of their subsistence base, become fully dependent 
on emergency food aid. The war often makes the normal outlets 
for trade and migration impossible, causing a tense situation in 
the camps. When food relief is delayed these tensions get dan­
gerously high. Food and nutrition levels are, therefore, 
frequently better in some Renamo areas than in the government ac­
commodation centres.
GOVERNMENT ABUSES OF FOOD AID
Since 1990 there has been an increase in the number of reports 
suggesting that ill-fed and ill-disciplined army units have been 
robbing relief supplies. One recent example, from a March 5th 
radio Mozambique broadcast, gives an idea of what is becoming an 
increasingly common and serious problem (5).
"A group of Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM), soldiers 
stole 74 tonnes of maize in Gaza province in January. 
That maize was intended for war-displaced and 
repatriated people currently living in Chicualacula. 
That maize was stolen from a Mozambique railway (CFM)- 
south train. The FAM soldiers have said they have 
received no pay or food rations in a long
time. Chicualacula Railway Station Chief, Benjamin 
Pirame, who reported the problem, has also said that 
government soldiers were also responsible for the theft 
of another 23 bags of maize".
Such accounts are now common all over the country. The situation 
in Nampula province, in particular, continues to be of great con­
cern, with government soldiers and militiamen disrupting the dis­
tribution of food aid, so that they could seize the food for 
themselves. Attacks on relief goods has forced one voluntary 
agency, German Agro Action, to suspend its operations in Nampula 
for the safety of its personnel. Following continued complaints 
from the NGOs and the local population, the government has opened 
an inquiry into military discipline and moral in the province.
Estimates for overall losses to the aid programs through corrup­
tion and the diversion of food aid are difficult to come by. 
During 6 months in 1989/90 there was a reported 2.9% loss of the
140,000 metric tonnes of relief food distributed by the Mozam­
bican government, a loss rate considered 'acceptable' by the in­
ternational NGOs. However, research by the European Community 
(EC) Food Security Department, in 1991, shows an even more
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alarming loss (6) . Government corruption in food aid distribu­
tion is becoming a significant contributing factor to the 
country's current relief deficit.
Food distribution in Mozambique is carried out by two state- 
controlled distribution systems:
a) Free distribution for emergency purposes,
b) Subsidised food distribution for urban and peri-urban 
markets.
The subsidised system functions through para-statal enterprises 
as receivers and wholesalers for the food aid, and through 
private retailers who have their quotas decided by government.
Since the structural adjustment programme was imposed in 1987, 
there has been a drastic devaluation of local currency and a 
sharp rise in demand for local currency - Meticais. The diver­
sion of food aid to the parallel markets has become one of the 
greatest revenue earners. Some estimates claim that up to 75% of 
total subsidised food aid is now marketed on the parallel markets 
in the main urban areas.
Continuing food shortages mean that enormous profits can be made 
from diverting and selling food aid on the parallel markets in 
the urban areas, further preventing the bulk of emergency food 
aid from entering into the hinterland. Surviving aid destined 
for the hinterland is then further diverted to cover the food 
needs of the sencodnary urban and rural centres. Distribution in 
these latter areas is then meant to be determined by the local 
army and administration.
Subsidised food aid is distributed in the following manner:
i) 10% is diverted in the port area and on the way to the
first big warehouses of the para-statal enterprises. The 
beneficiaries are thousands of soldiers, militia and 
security men as well as the workers of the port and railway 
authorities.
11) 25% is officially distributed within the subsidised system
at a price level which corresponds to about half of the
parallel market prices.
iii) 15% is diverted by all retailers included in the ration sys­
tem and distributed on parallel markets in the neighbourhood 
of their shops. This diversion is facilitated because most 
families do not have sufficient cash to purchase their 
monthly ration at once.
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iv) 50% of all food aid is diverted directly from the parastatal 
enterprises to the parallel markets. Government officials 
issue authorisations to numerous retailers who employ, 
through middlemen, thousands of saleswomen (most of them 
with families with no formal income) to sell the diverted 
food to the final consumers.
An important consequence of these distribution systems is the 
generation of an annual commercial and personal capital wealth of 
US$100 million in the hands of retailers of Indian origin 
(traditional bourgeoisie) and members of the party and government 
structure (new bourgeoisie). These profits are then mainly 
utilised in luxury consumption and capital flight.
The failure of food aid to reach its targeted destination brings 
additional suffering and constant insecurity to areas which need 
not suffer. Two-thirds of the population earn such a low income 
in the urban areas that they are only able to cover 64% of their 
calorie and protein needs. Besides this, 60% of their income is 
earned informally, especially by selling on parallel markets and 
stealing. The other third is obliged to dedicate part of their 
activities to alternative income opportunities. As a result 
productivity in the formal and informal sectors is extremely low.
SCORCHED EARTH POLICY
The government's counter-insurgency in Zambezia throughout 1987, 
with assistance from regular Tanzanian army units and Zimbabwean 
special forces, involved large-scale population displacement. 
Since many areas had come under Renamo's rudimentary administra­
tion, these facilities were destroyed and the food production 
systems had fire put to them. These tactics contributed to the 
1987 famine, Renamo can not be fully blamed for the famine. As 
will be discussed below, Zambezia is a critical area which both 
sides need to control.
One other important purpose of recuperation for the army is the 
looting of food and goods to sustain itself. The army also feeds 
itself by making forays into the large no-man's lands around its 
garrisons. Cassava, in particular, is sought after.
The operations in Zambezia province in 1987 resulted in an in­
crease in brutality as Renamo, government and allied forces 
herded civilians into their respective controlled zones. This is 
why such a large influx of refugees went to Malawi in this 
period, trying to escape either or both sides.
corched earth policy was worse in the province, in 1990, when it 
led to large numbers (thousands) of famine deaths amongst the 
people brought into the towns. This was because the towns could 
lot provide adequate food or health care. Aid agencies,
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particularly World Vision, at the time protested openly and 
privately about this situation. Since 1990 the situation has im­
proved in Zambezia.
It should, however, be emphasised that only in Zambezia is there 
tangible evidence that government used mass destruction of crops 
as a weapon against Renamo.
Government garrisons in many areas remain poorly fed, often 
neglected for months, even years. In such a situation it is not 
surprising that abuses of food aid take place, particularly in 
areas surrounded by hostile rebel activity. Neglect and low 
morale amongst many garrisons have contributed to rebel gains in 
government trying hard to increase the number of new conscript, 
the 1992 compulsory military service campaign has again been ex­
tended because of low turn out.
This situation is unlikely to improve until there is an end to 
the fighting. Large scale food relief to government military 
garrisons is not an acceptable international relief option. As 
in Angola, provisions for demobilising government forces so that 
they can receive food aid in the demobilisation camps once a 
cease-fire is signed have been discussed by both sides at the 
peace talks, in Rome, with their aides. These details will be­
come clearer when the eleventh round of peace talks get underway, 
in Rome, at the end of April for Protocol No. 4.
RENAMO
The first account from Renamo itself about its tactics related to 
food was given by its first President, Andre Matsangaissa in late 
June 1979. Matsangaissa in late June 1979. Matsangaissa gave a 
vivid depiction of the movement saying (7).
"We are not interested in policy making ...
later we will have to work out politics, but first communism 
must go from our country, it is killing us, we have to kill 
for everything we want. We kill for food, for pills, for 
guns and ammunition. We have not enough guns for all our 
recruits and many are armed with knives, sticks and even 
bows and arrows. Whenever we can assist the locals with 
food, seeds or whatever medical supplies we can obtain, we 
do".
This was very much the way Renamo units operated in the early 
years of the war. An early South African training manual, which 
taught how to ambush, retreat and where to leave Renamo 
propaganda, also advised "units to live off the land" by captur­
ing supplies and destroying anything remaining so as to deny it 
to the enemy (8).
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When it was under Rhodesian management, Renamo appears to have 
been encouraged to operate an embryonic "hearts and minds" cam­
paign in 1978/79, in the Sierra de Gorongosa. The Lancaster 
House Agreements and the transfer of operations to the Republic 
of South Africa in 1980, seems to have ended these attempts 
(Phase II).
Phase II Renamo bases of Sitatonga and Garagua relied heavily on 
logistical supplies from South Africa. This support came from 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) bases of Phalaborwa and 
Skukuza in the eastern Transvaal. Latrine and kitchen middens 
from both bases, provided ample proof of the level of support 
Renamo was receiving at this time from South Africa. Raul Domin­
gos, Renamo's Secretary of Organisation claimed at a London Press 
Conference, in February, that only 35% of Renamo's logistical 
support came from South Africa. For these very early years at 
least, the claim must be hollow.
By late 1983, Renamo insurgency expanded rapidly throughout many 
areas of Mozambique. As one SADF official involved in its run­
ning recently admitted (9):-
"By mid-1983 we found Renamo could not be easily con­
trolled. You give these fuzzy wuzzies some freedom and 
they do their own thing. We still had influence, they 
needed us, especially when things went bad in the bush. 
But they spread far beyond our own plans for them - 
only Munts (Africans) could create such violence. I 
guess Ken Flower's right, a monster out of control".
With the N'komati non-aggression pact between the Mozambican 
government and South Africa in 1984, Renamo operations entered a 
third phase. South Africa disengaged further from Renamo and ad­
vised them, in particular, to destroy the economic and social in­
frastructure rather than more hazardous military targets.
There "soft" target included railways, bridges, trucks and shops. 
Captured Renamo documents, from 1985, reveal South African advice 
to Renamo, to destroy the rural infrastructure and target ex­
patriate workers providing development assistance.
One of the most devastating effects has been Renamo1s obstruction 
or diversion of famine relief.
In 1988, 40 trucks were destroyed and 23 drivers and 
assistant drivers killed.
In 1989, 37 trucks were destroyed and five drivers killed(10) .
he EC relief programme continues to estimate that some 105 of 
s relief effort is lost in Renamo attacks. Such Renamo opera- 
ions continue. Denial or manipulation of food aid is seen by
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Renamo commanders as a way of making people support Renamo. A 
senior Renamo official recently confirmed such thinking by saying
(II):
"Food is a tool of war, we use it to make strategic gains, 
but so does the Frelimo marxists! The key to our success is 
that our forces fight on full stomachs. Frelimo is the word 
for hunger - the people know this and join us. The ances­
tors are well fed by us too. This gives us strength and 
fertility: we are winning, Frelimo has none of this".
Joseph Hanlon, in the early 1980s, obtained accounts from 
peasants of Renamo introducing itself into new areas by giving a 
party and serving stolen food (12). Renamo also selected, for 
attack, traders who had cheated the local population and also 
corrupt government officials. When a shop is sacked, some goods 
are usually redistributed to the local population. To give only 
one example, when Luabo was first captured in 1985, Renamo used 
the captured land-rovers and tractors to transport some of the 
booty to the surrounding villages for distribution amongst the 
local population. In Nampula province Renamo appears to refrain 
from attacking the agricultural marketing network until after the 
peasants have sold their crops.
Ken Wilson has also noted that, in Milange in 1984/85, Renamo 
also attacked people in areas under government control, stealing 
their food and distributing it to their own areas in order to 
make people come over and join it.
One cannot generalise about Renamo's operations from 1983/84 on­
wards. Continuing research shows that Renamo's treatment of the 
populations under its domination varies considerably. According 
to the accounts of Mozambicans who have experienced it, Renamo's 
administrative set-up can be classified according to geographi­
cal, logistical and local political factors. Robert Gersony 




Categorising Mozambique under any of these labels should continue 
to be made with caution, given the fluidity of the insurgency. 
However, it is becoming clear that in each "category" a different 
strategy towards food security can be defined.
Let us take "tax" areas for example. These equate with much of 
Renamo's dominated territory. Their main function is to produce 
food and services for the organisation. In these areas Renamo 
frequently only imposes tribute demands on the local population; 
sometimes no more than previously demanded by head-men or chiefs.
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Research, in Zambezia by Ken Wilson, suggests that tribute 
demands were a day a week on food production for the rebels in 
some districts. This taxation was ordered, the Renamo ad­
ministration being created to'collect it. It was also charged 
according to the ability to pay. Frequently this was sufficient 
to generate resentment.
Forced porterage labour was also a great problem for food produc­
tion in these "tax areas". It meant that the food production 
network often suffered as the healthy were co-opted by Renamo 
combatants into military porterage. Since Renamo's destruction 
of the marketing system threatened basic commodity supplies and 
labour to produce food was limited, people in these areas had to 
often travel long distances to Malawi to buy supplies, at poor 
exchange rates. This made them even poorer.
In the "control" zones the rebel presence is more visible. For 
example, interviews made with refugees, in 1985 from Gorongosa 
district (Sofala), suggests that Renamo did attempt to set up an 
alternative administration, with crude health clinics and even 
some schools. In many cases these were poorly resourced, poor 
replicas of the government system which Renamo had deliberately 
destroyed. It appears that a similar more sophisticated system 
was created in western Zambezia, in 1985/86.
Any Renamo administration remains dependent on success in the war 
for any element of a benign approach to the populations under its 
control. Being fundamentally a rebel military organisation with 
little ideology, it is constrained in how sophisticated it can 
become. Military logistics, like changing battle-fronts and the 
need of air-cover, have played important roles in effecting rebel 
behaviour. In central Mozambique quite sophisticated settlement 
patterns developed in rebel areas before 1985, (these can be 
picked up with remote sensing and Satellite imagery from the 
period and are confirmed by refugee accounts). For example, 
Gogogo base (Sofala) as a subsidiary to Casa Banana headquarters, 
possessed a clinic, school and extensive area of cultivated 
fields. Civilians were required to work in these fields two days 
a week for which, in return, they received the very limited serv­
ices on offer. Luxury items came from Casa Banana and were given 
only to combatants and Renamo officials. No individualism 
(except religion), was permitted. When special meetings took 
place at Casa Banana, Gogogo was required to provide labour and 
food. At times this meant that the civilian population had to starve (15).
With Zimbabwe's full entrance into the war in 1985 Renamo faced 
additional threat from the air. The large bases fragmented, the 
key ones being moved to more inaccessible locations such as 
marshes or caves in the top of Kopjes. Food security for resi­
dent populations in Renamo areas deteriorated considerably.
As these areas came under military pressure, Renamo forced many 
villagers to enter into portering duties or forcibly relocated 
them. Food production areas also came back under government con­
trol making Renamo tax the local populations, remaining in its 
zones, more forcibly. From 1985/86 whatever support Renamo had 
gained was replaced, as a result of its politics, by growing am­
bivalence. As one refugee from the area said, in 1989:
"All soldiers want our food and daughters".
The experience at Gogogo base is part of a recurrent pattern in 
the Mozambican conflict. When Renamo comes under military or 
logistical pressure, it becomes more authoritarian and repressive 
(16) .
Some logistical aid is still reaching Renamo from South African
and Kenyan sources. Indeed there is now some "non-lethal" aid
coming from western nations with the reluctant blessing from the 
Mozambique government. These are given under the guise of 
"facilitating" the peace process, or Renamo "confidence 
building". However, it does not equate with the levels given in 
the past by the South African Military intelligence. One SADF 
official described the post-1984 operations as (17):
"giving them a helping hand. The MNR are an asset, we 
could not just drop them. What we did was stoke them 
up with a drop or two when they looked in danger of
fizzling out. Easy for us, and kept Frelimo on its
toes".
It is a chilling remark, reminding one of the suspected stoking 
up that the "Hidden Hand" is doing in the South African townships 
to destabilise transition. Like Mozambique, township violence 
derives from a mixture of indigenous tensions and grievances, ex­
ploited and manipulated by die-hard extremists in the security 
forces.
These drops, mostly by air, were only occasionally food supplies, 
and then only luxury items for rebel leadership. Secret South 
African Submarine drops near Mozambique island, in 1987, appear 
to have included several consignments of Carling Black Label ac­
cording to local observers. Several Renamo commanders prefer 
this to any other beer, including the late Calisto Meque (18). 
But generally Renamo has had to feed its combatants from booty, 
food aid and the produce from its tax and control zones.
Food security dictates military strategy and, indeed, has con­




Food and its availability are critically important for Renamo. As 
one Renamo official admittedi—
"Our soldiers come first, they are fighting for freedom"
(19) .
Probably the best example of the importance of food security for 
the rebels is the history of the neo-traditional movement 
Naparama (Barama) in Zambezia.
Naparama was a volunteer militia army, led by a 28-year old 
traditional healer called, Manuel Antonio, who claimed he had a 
special magical powers that could protect his followers from 
Renamo. Belief in his power grew so quickly that, between March 
1990 and March 1991, he and his 20,000 warriors were able to ad­
vance into Renamo dominated territory and free it. In this way 
many Renamo camps were captured and hundreds of Mozambicans 
freed, the rebels having fled convinced that it was futile to 
fight against the spiritual protection given to Naparama's fol­
lowers by magic.
A vicious series of events took place, clouded in secrecy and 
magic, but based upon logistical necessity. Control of Zambezia 
is essential if Renamo is to negotiate a cease-fire from a posi­
tion of strength. The province's fertility makes it the bread­
basket of Mozambique. In 1986/87, the rebels set up, in many 
areas, a food production system based on taxation and labour to 
exploit this potential. This posed a serious threat to the 
government, and provoked a vicious and successful scorched-earth 
policy, by the army, to deny Renamo access to supplies by making 
amy areas uninhabitable. A large percentage of the one million 
refugees, now in Malawi, fled this callous tug-of-war for control 
of Zambezia. by 1989, Renamo had to partially retreat and rely 
on other less fertile areas for food production. But with late 
rains and crop failure in 1990, it needed the lush and fertile 
land, because it also wanted to develop a constituency of support 
for its bid for power. Density of population in Zambezia made 
the province more attractive.
In March 1990 a crack Renamo unit, the Grupo Limpa was sent north 
to win over control of Zambezia. By August 1990 very serious 
fighting was taking place, with Renamo leader, Afonso Dhlakama, 
leading military operations in Zambezia against Naparama. Between 
August 9th and September 19th, Dhlakama remained in the bush out 
of touch from the mediators fighting. A late August Renamo 
statement ruling out more peace talks until (improbable) con­
ference on southern African peace was held, was designed to give 
Renamo time to make the military gains it needed.
FOOD SECURITY & ITS EFFECTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS
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Renamo's September 19th recapture of Lalaua marked the beginning 
of the end for Naparama. It demonstrated, beyond doubt, to the 
local residents that "Naparama1 s magic was not as strong as the 
Matsanga" (Renamo). Once Naparama had fragmented, Dhlakama could 
feel confident about participating in the peace process, knowing 
his forces were once more making gains throughout Zambezia. 
Indeed it was after Lalaua that, in secret talks in Malawi with 
Italian and government mediators, Dhlakama agreed to compromise 
and enter the peace process seriously. By December, Manuel An­
tonio was dead, killed by Renamo; Dhlakama had toured Europe and 
two protocols on peace had been signed in Rome (20).
Many areas of Zambezia remain under Renamo domination and some 
surviving Naparama units are now in loose alliance with Renamo.
Renamo, having strengthened its grip again on Zambezia, is hoping 
to build up a constituency of support. Hoes and seed obtained in 
Malawi have been distributed, as has captured food supplies in 
certain areas. It is clear that access to food supplies and the 
patronage linked to access and distribution are recognised, by 
the rebels, as important in their attempts to win support from 
the increasingly ambivalent peasantry.
It is interesting to note that in his visits, to the ICRC in 
Geneva and his meetings with western diplomats and officials in 
1991/92, Dhalakama has focused on obtaining agricultural, educa­
tional and electoral assistance. However, reports coming out of 
Zambezia at present suggest that because of the serious drought, 
south of the province, Renamo has dramatically increased its tax 
demands on peasant food production, causing great hardship.
Renamo also blames natural disasters on the Mozambican govern­
ment. In a letter to Tel-Evangelist, Pat Robertson, in November 
1986, Dhlakama writes:
"realise that the calamities of the past 10 years have not 
been accidental, they are direct results of an atheistic 
system. We in Renamo attribute our growing victories in our
struggle to liberate Mozambique to our faith".
Renamo has been quick in many areas to blame famine and illness
on Frelimo and its "evil spirits". Refugees speak of strange
rituals being used in times of famine in Renamo areas - droughts 
and crop failures being blamed on Frelimo magic. Fertility of 
the land and food production remain a critical consideration both 
in secular and spiritual spheres of Renamo's operations. (2).
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Maputo and Gaza provinces are "destruction" zones. Renamo offi­
cials have admitted as much. But they also add that:
"One problem is that people now believe we are behind all 
attacks. We do not have the capacity to do this with our 
forces. The attacks against civilians are by Frelimo and 
other forces. It is true that we have lost control over 
some forces, they do not like our disciplined and respon­
sible way of operating". (22)
Dhlakama echoed this point, in November, when speaking to Por­
tuguese NGO's and more recently, in March, to a western diplomat 
in Rome. The argument may be partly true, but it must be remem­
bered that in the south is, as one Renamo official explained,
"the land of Frelimo, we have few friends there". This 
would also explain the high levels of violence in these 
southern areas. (23)
These destruction areas are also those in which the seemingly 
wanton destruction of food stores and food aid convoys occurs. 
Reports from the south and along the Tete corridor, in 1991, 
describe vehicles full of food aid being burnt rather than the 
rebels removing the cargoes first. Conspicuous displays of the 
destruction of food are used by Renamo as powerful symbols of its 
destructive capacity an not just, as Renamo claims:
"To stop food reaching enemy positions".
In several incidents there was time and sufficient porters to 
remove the bags of rice and maize if the rebels had wished. As 
with the conspicuous consumption and ritualised brutality, - the 
public destruction of food aid is a deliberate and effective 
weapon of war. Sending a very vivid message to the thousands of 
hungry deslocados waiting for food relief to arrive in their ac­
commodation centre, it is very effective in eroding morale. As an 
old man in Derre (Zambezia) in October said (24):
"Renamo keeps us in Derre like an animal in a sack; anyone 
leaving the security of the town for food or to open farms 
at the rains start is liable to be killed or kidnapped. Four 
of us were killed yesterday and eight this morning".
The people in Derre, as in many other areas of Zambezia, must 
choose between starvation and Renamo. Only World Vision airlifts 
of emergency, food avert full scale starvation.
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THE OFFENSIVE ON THE TOWNS
Renamo has launched a large-scale offensive on the towns from 
December, aiming to instill further insecurity in the urban areas 
and to erode, thereby, confidence in the government's capacity to 
govern. Some members on Renamo1s National Conference still 
believe that Frelimo will collapse under military pressure, and 
that Renamo will gain power as a result.
The international community is concerned that this does not hap­
pen. It hopes to suck Renamo into the peace process so deeply 
through continued strategy of pressure "sticks" and incentives 
"carrots", that it will be difficult for the rebels to disengage 
from it. Similar tactics contributed to bringing about the 
Bicesse agreements, which ended the 16-year old civil war in An­
gola, in May 1991.
Renamo1s response has been to increase raiding as the peace 
process continues. Renamo believes it must capture as much ter­
ritory as possible before signing a serious cease-fire agreement. 
As in Angola some of the fiercest fighting to the war is likely 
to take place in its final months. But there is another reason, 
which is the drought in the south has forced rebel units into 
further raiding. Booty-rich locations in the rural areas con­
tinue to diminish after so many years of conflict. Since December 
1990, Renamo strategy has been not to raid across Zambian or Zim­
babwe borders, thereby further limiting possible targets; Renamo 
units are, therefore, increasingly attacking suburbs, especially 
the "Zones Verdes" (market gardening areas) of the main urban and 
semi-urban areas. In January 1992, there were 71 attacks on 
Maputo alone (some of these attacks are government renegade 
forces), mainly for food and supplies, although propaganda was 
also left. As long as the drought continues, this type of attack 
will increase. (25)
DEMILITARISED OR 'PEACE' ZONES
This idea has come up again in response to the current drought in 
Mozambique. The ideas are not new. Neutral relief corridors 
operated in Angola and Ethiopia during the conflicts there with 
varying degrees of success.
In Mozambique such ideas have been circulating since the mid 
1980s. The first move in this direction was by the ICRC. In 
1988 the ICRC obtained the government's reluctant permission to 
fly relief, by scheduled flights, along predetermined routes to 
recognised airstrips within Renamo dominated territory. The 
flight arrangements were transmitted to Renamo via Tom Schaaf and 
his Mozambique Research Centre (MRC), in Washington D.C., until 
1990 from ICRC headquarters in Geneva. The MRC supplied Renamo
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with solar-energy battery chargers, lap-top word processors and 
printers which could be linked into TR-48 radios for the purpose. 
(26)
In June 1990 , the ICRC tried to expand this by lobbying for in­
ternational support for setting up "natural safe zones" in Renamo 
areas, on lines of the Kurdish model in Iraq. This came to noth­
ing because of the cost and the international understanding that 
conflict in Mozambique bears no similarity to events in northern 
Iraq.
This was followed in, October 1991, by Dhlakama announcing that 
his forces would no longer attack the Limpopo corridor (in fact, 
they are still attacking it) . In November, Dhlakama followed 
this up by suggesting that the border town of Ressano Garcia 
could be treated as a "peace zone", as long as the government 
also demilitarised the town. If successful, other peace zones 
would follow. Nothing further has happened. (27)
Neutral areas in rural Mozambique do nevertheless exist, but only 
between local neo-traditional authorities and the warring fac­
tions. In return for payment Renamo also stopped attacking the 
Nacala line in August 1990 and, since February 1991, the Cahora 
Bassa power lines. There are even accounts of local Renamo com­
manders making local agreements with Frelimo or Zimbabwean units 
not to fight the other.
The central government in Maputo is only now beginning to think 
about neutral relief corridors. The seriousness of the drought 
and the government's weakening military strength have contributed 
to this change in thinking. Jacinto Veloso, minister for Co­
operation, on March 11th voiced this change in thought by saying 
that he could see "no objection" to the concept of neutral relief 
corridors. However, the government continues to hold reserva­
tions over how it would be put into practice. It is likely that 
these "corridors of peace" will be discussed in the eleventh 
round of peace talks when they start again in late April.
The government's greatest concern is how to monitor such an 
operation, so that Renamo combatants did not obtain access to the 
relief supplies, thereby strengthening their war effort against 
the government. ICRC distribution of relief aid in rebel areas 
is, as the officials themselves concede, "not fool proof".
Renamo is also taking an interest in "peace corridors" for relief 
because many of its dominated areas are seriously affected by 
drought. The increasing numbers of peasants moving out of Renamo 
•dominated" territory since January, raises problems for the 
rebels too. During the seven week "holiday", which Dhlakama 
claimed his negotiating team needed in Gorongosa following the
end of the tenth round of peace talks in Rome on March 13th, 
Renamo1s National Council will meet to discuss its response to 
this development.
Renamo cannot afford to lose large numbers of people from its 
areas of control or influence. It needs them for production, 
portering duties and as potential voters in any election. Yet 
using force to retain them in a situation, which will only bring 
starvation, will further erode support. As a peasant entering an 
accommodation centre described in February: (28)
"There is little food with Matsanga now. What food we have, 
they take... All soldiers are the same. We are here to es­
cape the hunger that kills".
As more people move into the government sphere again for food, 
access to international food aid is becoming an important asset. 
The government has gained a tactical advantage from this. Whether 
it has the.capacity to capitalise on this remains to be seen.
Recent reports for Angola underline how important access to food 
aid will be after a cease-fire is signed (29).
There appears to be a gross over-supply of food in areas around 
UNITA's HQ at Jamba (Cuando Cubango prov). UNITA is apparently 
using this UN food aid to keep the refugee population under close 
control - thereby violating the terms of the Bicesse agreements.
UNITA is also making relief distribution in surrounding areas 
difficult, and insisting that all aid is distributed by UNITA of­
ficials. This maintains peasant loyalty to the movement 
(potential votes) and discourages peasants from attempting to 
return to their home areas to restart subsistence farming. Fol­
lowing good rains this year these peasants could, if allowed, be 
self-sufficient in food within a year. Setting up monitors and 
safeguards against similar abuse in Mozambique is vital. Vital, 
if an end to conflict in Mozambique is to be lasting.
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ANNEX 5
THE POLITICS OF FOOD AID TO MOZAMBIQUE
JOSEPH HANLON
1. WITHHOLDING FOOD
In 1979 there was a sever drought in Inhambane and Gaza 
provinces, but a successful government-run and donor-supported 
relief effort ensured no one died. In 1982 the rains failed 
again, and in January 1983 Mozambique appealed for food aid for 
the same zone, pointing to a complete crop failure. But food aid 
pledges fell.
why? Because Mozambique was a target of South African backed 
destabilisation, and food was a weapon of war. One prominent 
South African academic had proposed curtailing food "to cause 
serious hardship to the population, who would in turn direct 
their frustration and fury at the target's regime". South 
African-backed forces destroyed peasant food stocks and attacked 
relief lorries in Inhambane and Gaza. It was, one US official 
admitted privately, "a man-made, South-African-made famine". But 
this was at the height of the cold war and the US backed South 
Africa against Marxist Mozambique; famine was a weapon in that 
war and donors would not take sides. The World Food Programme 
insisted its food not go to Inhambane and Gaza, where it was most 
needed. Another US official told me "We made clear to the 
government of Mozambique that our food aid is political. There 
are always conditions on aid". Mozambique had to "turn toward 
the west". It did so, and by December aid, that had been 
requested in January, was being flown in. But not before
100,000 people had died.
Donors again used food aid to put pressure on Mozambique in late 
1986, when South African-backed Renamo forces combined with 
drought to cause hunger in Zambezia province. Mozambique was 
seen to be dragging its feet in talks with the World Bank, and 
there was a donor strike. Mozambique agreed to structural 
adjustment on January 14, 1987, and aid poured in; food aid
pledges in 1987 were double in 1986.
2. WHO DISTRIBUTES FOOD
One US condition in 1983 was that Care be involved in food aid on 
the ground. Care wanted to distribute food itself, but the 
government said no. As a compromise, Care was to help set up a 
agistic Support Unit for food aid distribution within the 
government. in a total reversal of traditional tables, the 
:apitalist us backed Care's demand that a new, totally state-run, 
a I lei system of food aid be created, in opposition to Marxist 
:ambique's efforts to use the private sector and integrate food
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aid distribution with the commercial network. One effect was to 
weaken agricultural marketing and make people permanently aid 
dependent.
Under it contract with Mozambique, Care was to set up proper 
accounting systems and train Mozambican staff to run them. Two 
official evaluations showed it consistently failed to do so - 
indeed it did not even set up a formal training programme. 
Donors demanded that other agencies should help the government of 
Mozambique to do this, but the US embassy successfully (until 
1990) backed Care's claim that it had an exclusive contract. In 
a unprecedented series of reports, donor and Mozambique 
government criticism of Care became increasingly public. 
Care-organised record keeping was so poor that it was impossible 
to track food aid. The US also admitted it sent food to the 
commercial network in bags labelled "not for sale", which made it 
virtually impossible to track food.
Meanwhile, IMF imposed structural adjustment meant that 
government salaries were not high enough to survive on. 
Corruption was the inevitable result of low wages and poor record 
keeping. It remains impossible to distinguish between the two. 
The US and the EC then began to campaign to allege that 
corruption was so great that food aid should be distributed not 
by the government, but by conservative (and normally 
church-linked and anti-Frelimo) non-government organisations. 
Some reports by the US and others were manifestly false; for 
example, the US alleged that food, which had gone to Maputo 
province and for which there were accurate records, had been 
diverted because it was not in the records for Maputo city; 
despite government complaints, it never published a correction.
Clearly corruption is serious and growing. But the US created 
the conditions which fostered and encouraged that corruption, and 
now exaggerates the scale and impact of that corruption.
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F.RTTREA: PROBLEMS. OPTIONS & PRIORITIES
BERHANE WOLDEMICHAEL
INTRODUCTION
Eritrea faces a very daunting task. Thirty years of war and the 
successive droughts of recent years combined have left the 
country with such socio-economic devastation that nothing less 
than the most considered programme, and determined effort to 
guarantee its implementation, will be needed to reverse what 
seems a hopeless situation. Last November (1991) I went to the 
part of Eritrea I come from after many years of living in exile, 
and I would like to share my experience with the participants of 
this conference. What I found this time, compared to the period 
when I knew it before, was quite shocking, to say the least. As 
will be described below, I hope I will be able to impress the 
participants of the conference of the real problems in Eritrea 
and the need for immediate intervention by all concerned. But I 
should like to believe that any move to support Eritrea at this 
very crucial stage of rehabilitation will be based on an honest 
ground of co-operation with the Eritrean authorities. The 
Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) has declared an all out 
war against hunger, and I think all humanitarian organisations 
have a moral duty to respond. Concurrent with the war against 
hunger, the PGE has also declared an economic programme that 
would make Eritrea self-supporting. Eritrea has the potential 
and the will to achieve this goal and one hopes that it will 
receive all the assistance it so desperately needs to implement 
its programmes. However, even at this desperate moment I would 
argue that Eritrea should never compromise its overall develop­
mental principles. In many of the developing countries where the 
"driving seat" have been taken over by donor organisations, the 
evidence is that aid has done more harm than good to those countries.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Eritrea lies in the extended Sahelian belt of Africa. Eritrea is 
customarily broadly divided into three main physiographicalareas:
The deqa (highland areas), which lie above 2,000 metres inelevation.
The Meine-dega (midland areas), which lie between 1,000 to2,000 metres.
he gola (lowland areas), which lie below 1,000 metres.
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The occupational activities of the rural population of Eritrea 
have been conditioned by the geographic situation of the country 
(see appendix 1.) and comprises of the agricultural, agro- 
pastoralism and pastoralism.
1. Agriculturalists:
The agriculturalists exclusively occupy the highland and the 
midland areas of rural Eritrea. Agriculturalists are seden­
tary farmers whose livelihood depends primarily on the cul­
tivation of crops.
2. Agropastoralists:
They are largely (73%) found in the lowland areas. Crop and 
livestock husbandry are both essential to their livelihood.
They live in permanent homesteads, but seasonal movement in
search of pasture is common, mostly involving some members 
of a household only.
3. Pastoralists:
They represent abut 6% of the total rural population of 
Eritrea and are wholly lowlanders. Pastoralists do not live 
in permanent homesteads and livestock are their primary 
means of livelihood.
An EPLF survey (1) in 1987 estimated the rural population of
Eritrea to be 2.4 million. This estimate did not include the
many - more than a million according to some estimates - who fled 
the country to take refuge outside their country. The population 
of Asmara, the capital city, is estimated to have soared to about 
half-a-million over the last few years because of the war situa­
tion. The other towns of Eritrea combined would probably ac­
count for about a guarter-of-a-million people, which brings the 
total population of Eritrea to just over three million. If the 
Eritreans in diaspora were to be included, this total figure 
would be in the region of four million.
CURRENT REALITIES
AN EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT OF VILLAGE-X
I have a vivid memory of village-X from the time I lived there 
until the age of sixteen. Like all the villages in what is 
generally known as highland Eritrea, village-X is an autonomous 
and self-contained social and political unit. It has a well 
defined boundary and administers its territory by a mechanism of 
communal control. The village land is allocated to different 
uses and is regulated by a complex set of rules and regulations
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that every village member must abide by. In the main, village- 
x's land is divided between farm-land, woodland and pasture- 
lands.
During my time in the village, the woodland area, mostly compris­
ing of a range of mountains, was covered with trees and shrubs 
and with thick forest in some parts. The range of mountains was 
also the residence of a variety of wild animals, and hence was a 
favoured hunting ground for the well-to-do Italians residing in 
Asmara at the time. Below the range of mountains is a vast fer­
tile and flat stretch of agricultural land. In a good harvest 
year, this land will produce all the crop requirements of the 
village community. The month of November, as I clearly remember, 
was normally an exciting and busy time for the farming community, 
who would be engaged in harvesting their crops. Some crops of 
the legume family, for example chick peas, are sown late as they 
do not require as much rain, and hence some farm-land will also 
be green during this period. This period was also a time of 
plenty for domestic animals with the freshly harvested fields 
serving as pasture lands.
In contrast to what I have described above, the same village-X 
that I had known some thirty years back is quite a different vil­
lage now. The scale of environmental degradation that has oc­
curred in that part of the world is hard to describe. The trees 
and shrubs that once covered the woodland areas have all gone. 
The extent of the erosion that has taken is such that hardly any 
top soil is to be seen on the face of the mountains. Instead, 
exposed stones are all that cover the once woodland area.
I purposely planned a visit to Eritrea, in November, hoping to 
see the harvesting activities which to me was the most fascinat­
ing period of village life. Unfortunately, my hopes were dashed. 
There has not been sufficient rain in that part of Eritrea for 
the past ten years. In the last rainy season, hardly any rain 
fell and, as a result, farming activity has come to a halt. The 
farm fields were bare, dusty and brown which was a sad scene at 
what should normally be a busy harvest time.
A spectacle of village life, when I was part of it, used to be in 
the early evenings as the animals returned from grazing and the 
mothers met their young ones. The village has lost most of its 
animals which have either been sold, eaten or have died because 
of the drought. The few that are left are mostly pack animals 
(donkeys) that freely roam the village, even during the night, 
he free roaming of the animals struck me as most unusual, be­
cause they used to be herded in before the fall of darkness for 
ear of attack by hyenas. The disappearance of the scavenger 
hyenas is m  itself an indication of the ferocity of the drought affecting the area.
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The life of the community is now wholly being sustained by exter­
nal help - contributions from family members living in towns, or 
abroad and from charity hand-outs. There has been an understand­
able despair among the village community in the last
few years. Not only was the village community bearing the full 
brunt of the drought, but also severe repression from an occupy­
ing Ethiopian military force that was venting its frustration on 
the village community as it started to lose its grip on Eritrea 
with the intensification of the liberation struggle.
THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON VILLAGE-X
The stories I heard, the accuracy of which I do not doubt, as 
they were told to me by people to whom I am closely related, are 
too repugnant to give the details of here. However, I gathered 
that the many villagers who died from famine related illnesses, 
at the height of the drought in 1984 and 1985 and again in 1988, 
would have survived had it not been for the fear of the Ethiopian 
army which made the community virtual prisoners and hence unable 
to move about in search of help. Village-X is only about 18 
miles from Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, but the Ethiopian 
Army presence was everywhere and not many villagers would venture 
to go there lest they put their lives at risk.
As the Ethiopian Army became more desperate in the last few 
years, remaining in your own village was no guarantee of safety. 
In fact, the closely knit villages became convenient targets for 
exploitation and control. Under Ethiopian army occupation, the 
village chief was not one chosen by the village community in the 
traditional democratic way, but implanted by the Ethiopian 
government. His task became not to mediate on village affairs, 
but to command obedience through indiscriminate terror. Every 
now and then the Ethiopian army was raiding the village and pil­
laging for food; rape and forceful conscription to the Ethiopian 
army had become a way of life. Any one opposing the army moves 
would be given on the spot judgement which was usually execution 
by shooting. Dawit Wolde Giorgis, one time Mengistu's military 
governor of Eritrea, has confessed the impact of Ethiopia's rule 
in Eritrea. In a book he wrote after his defection, he admitted 
that, between 1975 and 1983, some 280,000 civilians died in the 
war in Eritrea (Giorgis, 1983:113).
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF DROUGHT AND WAR
As shown in table 1. below an EPLF survey in 1987 established the 
factors limiting production of cereal crops for 1986 and 1987. 
From the findings of the survey, the following ten factories, 
ranked in terms of their limiting importance, provide a clear 
picture of the problems in rural Eritrea today.
- 5 -
Table 1.
Ranking Of Factors Limiting Production Of Cereal 
Crops In Rural Eritrea





Ethiopian Army Atrocity 13 11
Seeds 10 5
Pests, Excluding Locusts 9 4
Plough Implements 8 9




Source: EPLF, food and agriculture production assessment study
in Eritrea (see also preliminary report submitted to 
the emergency relief desk by a consultancy team in 
1987:22)
In table 1. above, lack of labour and Ethiopian army atrocities, 
could, in fact, both be categorised as war factors and thus com­
bined would become the second most important limiting factor be­
hind lack of oxen in 1986 and third behind lack of rain and oxen 
in 1987. It is important to appreciate that 1986 and 1987 were 
years when the Ethiopian army was pinned in its garrisons after 
suffering successive military defeats by the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Army (EPLA) , the military wing of the EPLF, and had a 
survey been conducted in earlier years, no doubt the war factor 
could well have lead the ranking.
The fact that lack of oxen and rain scored highly in 1986 and 
1987 is not surprising, being a reflection of the severe drought 
that affected the country in 1984 and 1985. Lack of seed was a 
major factor in 1986 which is worrying as the crop types geneti­
cally adapted to the Eritrean situation may become extinct should 
the drought situation persist.
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The cumulative effect of all these factors on the Eritrean rural 
economy has quite simply been disastrous. In the 1987 survey, it 
was further established that 62% of the Eritrean population were 
living below poverty level. The definitions of rich and poor are 
in the Eritrean context. The rich peasant family is one that has 
just enough food to sustain it on to the next season or harvest. 
Within this context, it is not difficult to imagine what poverty 
in Eritrea really means.
The above mentioned survey found that the pastoral population has 
dwindled to a mere 5% of the total rural population. This is far 
less than might have been expected because in 1944, the British 
Military Administration in Eritrea estimated the pastoralist 
population in 26% of the total population. It is likely that war 
and drought are the main factors in the decline. The Ethiopian 
army has been plundering the pastoral community by taking their 
animals for food. Some managed to escape to the liberated areas, 
but the drought of recent years has cruelly depleted what 
remained of their livestock.
THE HARDY ERITREANS
The Eritreans are a hardy lot. How the populations of village-X 
sustained itself through the severity of the successive droughts 
and the cruelty of the Ethiopian Army is hard to imagine. 
However, the village communities feel that liberation came just 
in time. Many believe that the community would have faced a real 
threat of total destruction had the conflict continued for any 
length of time. My visit to village-X was five months after 
liberation and I was told by the village community of the im­
provements in their life since then. To me everybody in the vil­
lage looked thin and malnourished but I was told that, had I come 
a few months earlier, I would have witnessed a much worse situa­
tion. "Happiness and hope is more than food", a villager told 
me, and even given the kind of misery I witnessed, the village 
community was full of confidence that, with peace, they can con­
front anything. As far as can be established from the example of 
village-X, the effects of the war, whether directly or in­
directly, were the main factors in the high number of deaths that 
have occurred in the last few years in Eritrea.
POLICIES AND PRIORITIES
No one is more aware of the current realities in Eritrea than the 
Provisional Government. After the liberation of Eritrea, the 
PGE's priority has been to fight the war against hunger. This is 
being tackled on two fronts. The first is the relief operation 
which aims to reach the population that has been hardest hit by 
the lack of food. The PGE has made an open call to all 
humanitarian organisations to help in its relief operation. 
There is no doubt of the will and capacity of the PGE to effect 
its policies as attested by many recent eye witness reports by
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visitors to Eritrea. Unfortunately, international politics has 
been playing with the lives of people. Some countries are drag­
ging their feet on directly responding to the PGE's call and have 
been denying aid to Eritrea under the pretext that it is not yet 
an internationally recognised state. I hope all concerned in­
dividuals and organisations will press the governments which are 
adopting a "do nothing attitude" to support the Eritrean people 
at this critical time of need.
The second major policy objective of the PGE is to achieve a 
self-reliant economy. This does not mean, of course, that 
Eritrea will have a closed economy. What it means is that 
Eritrea will avoid the situation which Eould put its economy in a 
state of perpetual dependence. The idea behind the policy of 
self-reliance is to emphasise the Provisional Government's objec­
tive of freeing the Eritrean people from relying on hand-outs as 
soon as possible. Self-reliance, therefore, encompasses the 
development of attitude, the psychological or mental preparedness 
of being independent or self-reliant.
In spite of the drought in recent years, agriculture will remain 
the mainstay of Eritrea's economy. I have discussed elsewhere 
issues dealing with rural land policies in Eritrea (2) and suf­
fice it to say here that in most parts of the country a fair and 
equitable land distribution systems exist. However, imaginative 
and workable policy interventions will be needed to provide ad­
vice on soil protection, water harvesting and methods of improv­
ing agricultural practices. It must be stressed that some seem­
ingly attractive but unworkable policies should be avoided in 
Eritrea. For example, many countries prohibit the cutting of 
trees for fire wood without providing an alternative. On the 
other hand, a practical intervention to assist the rural com­
munities would be to plant fast growing trees for the purpose of 
firewood. Therefore, since the eradication of hunger is the 
main policy objective in Eritrea, ways and means of improving 
agricultural output should be given priority.
THE MANAGEMENT OF AID
If there is anything in abundance in the developing countries, it 
is the experiences of aid supported projects: unfortunately, the 
failures greatly outnumber the success. The blame for such 
failures is usually heaped on the donors, in a most patronising 
way, for not involving the recipients in the decision making 
process. My views on this have always been that failures of 
aid-supported projects are primarily a reflection of ineptitude 
on the part of the recipient country. No country should give a 
free hand for decision making on matters that it will eventually 
asume the responsibility for sustaining. After all, the 
aasurement of success of a project is that it is compatible and
n the capability of both the government and the community atlarge to sustain it.
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NOTES:
1. The 1987 survey was a comprehensive research carried out to 
assess the food situation in Eritrea. The research project 
was supported by the emergency relief desk and a report has 
been published.
2. See in Martin Doornbos et al eds. (1992). "Beyond Conflict 
in the Horn: The Prospects for Peace, Recovery & Develop­
ment in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea & Sudan". The institute 
of Social Studies, the Hague, in association with James 
Curry, London
APPENDIX 1.
TABLE l: Rural Population Distribution by Occupation and
Location by Area (Highland, Midland & Lowland).
No's: in "000".
PROVINCE AGRICULTURE AGRO-PASTORAL PASTORAL
II M L II M L II M L
SAHEL - 75 - 218 - - - - 64
SENHIT - 93 - - - 50 - - 10
BARKA - - 181 - - 315 - - 40
HAMASIEN 267 74 - - - - - - -
SERAE 86 61 256 - - - - - -
SEMHAR - - - - - 155 - - -
A. GUZAI 109 274 - - - - - - -
DANKALIA - - - - - 59 - - 16
TOTAL BY 
AREA/OCCUP 462 577 437 218 - 579 - - 130
% 19% 24% 18% 9% - 24% - - 6%
TOTAL BY 
OCCUPATION 3.,476 797 130
% 62% 33% 6%
Source: EPLF Survey, 1987
Note: l. All percentages are of total population
2. The abbreviation H, M & S denote for Highland,
Midland & Lowland following the EPLF's land
classification by elevation
ANNEX 7
THE T.EGAL FRAME WORK OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF 
" TN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT
DENISE PLATTNER 
1. INTRODUCTION
The point of view that I have chosen in order to outline the 
legal framework of international relief is a very traditional 
one. Taking into consideration the existence of a very large 
body of international rules, on the one hand, and the current 
volume of humanitarian assistance activities, on the other, I 
propose to examine whether there is a relationship between the 
law governing humanitarian assistance in time of armed conflicts 
and the actual practice of the ICRC, the international organisa­
tions an the non-governmental organisations involved in relief 
activities. More simply, the question is the following: is in­
ternational humanitarian law relevant to the activity of the or­
ganisations concerned, and can it be assumed that these organisa­
tions are interested in abiding by its rules, or is humanitarian 
law a branch of international law whose constraints are ap­
plicable only to the ICRC?
Before I begin this talk, I would like to give a brief overview 
of international humanitarian law.
International humanitarian law is part of public international 
law and is composed of rules intended to alleviate the suffering 
of the victims of armed conflict. These rules restrict the 
choice of the belligerents with regard to the means and methods 
of combat they use and are, therefore, applicable to military 
operations as such. They also protect persons who are in the 
power of the enemy, like prisoners of war or the inhabitants of a 
occupied territory. Most of these rules are contained in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977, all these texts being international treaties.
International humanitarian law differs from human rights law. 
Unlike international human rights law, it applies only in situa­
tions of armed conflict and, therefore, creates obligations 
geared to the specific needs of the victims of armed conflict.
THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL & NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISA­
TIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
1949, there were few international agencies in existence, 
[oreover, the maintenance of peace, and not international relief, 
onsidered as being the primary aim of the organisations that 
been set up just after the Second World War. Although non­
governmental organisations appeared on the scene of international
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relations before inter-governmental organisations, there was at 
this time considerable scope for charitable activities inside 
these organisations' own countries of origin, and they were, 
therefore, not so much interested in external activities. It is 
thus hardly surprising that Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Con­
vention, which deals with relief actions undertaken in favour of 
the civilian population of an occupied territory, mentions, be­
sides "impartial humanitarian organisations such as the Interna­
tional Committee of the Red Cross", only the States. Article 23 
of the same Convention obliges States to allow the free passage 
of relief supplies to another State, and obligations that is 
meaningful only if the States concerned would be tempted not to 
authorise the passage of such goods, in particular in the event 
of a blockade. This provision, therefore, refers only to goods 
that can be sent by any individual or any entity, and not to the 
personnel that are generally included in the concept of relief 
"action".
Sufficient changes occurred between 1949 and 1977 to be reflected 
in the law. The two 1977 Protocols contain almost identical text 
whose working corresponds to present-day assistance procedures 
and those content meets the expectations of the States and the 
humanitarian organisations with regard to this new form of inter­
national activity. Whereas Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Con­
vention relates only to assistance in an occupied territory, Ar­
ticle 70 of Protocol I. regulates relief actions that take place 
within the national borders. This provision thus implies that in 
certain circumstances a belligerent State must accept relief 
operations undertaken in favour of its own population. Article 
18 of Protocol II deals with relief actions in the case of non­
international armed conflict. It constitutes a major improvement 
over Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, as it 
creates the obligation for the State concerned to give its con­
sent if the civilian populations, whether under its control or 
otherwise, is in need of essential supplies and if the offer of 
relief satisfies the conditions laid down by international 
humanitarian law.
The object of the obligations contained in Article 70 of Protocol 
1, and Article 18 of protocol II, is a "relief action", without 
any specification as to the entity that is supposed to undertake 
such a relief action. The rules of interpretation nevertheless 
require that Article 70 of Protocol I, be read together with Ar­
ticle 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; and Article 18 of 
Protocol II, together with Article 70 of Protocol I. This leads 
to a first conclusion, ie. that, as well as the ICRC and any 
other impartial humanitarian organisation, States too can under­
take relief action in favour of the population of a State party 
to a conflict. The opinion of legal experts must also be taken 
into account, and that opinion generally closely follows State 
practice. In 1989, the Institute of International Law
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stated in a resolution on the protection of human rights and the 
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of States, that 
an offer of food or medical supplies by "a State, a group of 
States, an international organisation or an impartial 
humanitarian body such as the ICRC" cannot, if certain conditions 
are fulfilled, be considered as unlawful intervention in the in­
ternal affairs of the State concerned. This leads to a second 
conclusion, i.e. that not only the States and the ICRC but also 
the international organisations can carry out a relief action 
within the meaning of the relevant provision of international 
humanitarian law.
Are non-governmental organisations excluded from the application 
of international humanitarian law? Even though the 1989 resolu­
tion of the Institute of International Law does not mention them, 
I would argue that the non-governmental character of an agency 
should not affect the duty of the State concerned to accept an 
offer of relief that fulfils the necessary conditions.
3. CONCESSIONS & LIMITS TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE REGULATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF
Article 70 of Protocol I, as well as the resolution of the in­
stitute of International law mentioned above, provides for an of­
fer of services. Does this mean that the government concerned 
has the discretionary power to accept or refuse that offer? 
Having regard to the relevant provisions of international 
humanitarian law, the answer is certainly in the negative. The 
government must agree to the beneficiaries receiving food and 
medical supplies, if the conditions required by the law are ful­
filled.
Is the condition of an offer of services a pointless concession 
to State sovereignty? If the right interpretation is given 
regarding the power of the State concerned to refuse the offer, 
that question should not be answered too quickly.
It is true that no mention of an offer of services is made either 
in Article 23 or in Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
But, as we have seen, Article 23 provides only for the free pas­
sage of relief supplies and not for a relief operation such as 
those that are undertaken today. Article 59 is worded in a 
rather imperative way; but the obligation it creates is aimed at 
the Occupying Power and governs relations between this authority 
and a foreign population. However, although the occupying Power 
seems to have no choice other than to accept the proposed action, 
O'.ar as this action is in conformity with the usual conditions 
aid down by international humanitarian law, due consideration 
be given to the fact that, unlike the case with actions un- 
ertaken in the State's own territory, supervision of the dis-
° relief by the ICRC or the Protecting Power is man­datory.
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Notwithstanding these two examples, it is doubtful whether an un­
dertaking on the scale of a relief operation requiring material 
and human resources such as means of transport, means of com­
munication and personnel involved in the evaluation of needs, and 
the transport and distribution of relief supplies could take 
place without the agreement of the local authorities. We can, 
therefore, conclude that although the condition of the offer of 
services is included in the law as a concession to State 
sovereignty, from the practical point of view an undertaking of 
this type without some form of prior negotiation would seem un­
thinkable.
The government must accept the offer of services if the action 
proposed is of a humanitarian, non-discriminatory and impartial 
nature. It should be noted that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
do not mention these conditions. The fact that they are men­
tioned in t h e .1977 must, however, not be considered as a change 
in the law. indeed, as seen earlier, control of the distribution 
of relief by an impartial and humanitarian organisation such as 
the ICRC, or by the protecting Power, is already mandatory in the 
1949 text.
Both Article 70 of protocol I, and Article 18 of Protocol II, set 
the condition that the civilian population must be in need of 
supplies essential for its survival. This condition must not be 
given too much importance. On the one hand, an offer that does 
not correspond to the needs of civilian population would probably 
not be in accordance with the principle of humanity. On the 
other hand, as violations of international humanitarian law do 
unfortunately take place during armed conflicts, such situations 
usually lead to a rapid deterioration of the population's stan­
dard of living. However, present-day possibilities in the field 
of international relief and the development in the law that have 
resulted there should not detract from the general duty of the 
belligerent State to see that its own population is adequately 
supplied. As Dr. Kouchner has pointed out, international relief 
is governed by the principle of subsidiarity.
If the proposed action is humanitarian, non-discriminatory and 
impartial, the offer of services cannot be considered as unlawful 
intervention in the internal affairs of the State concerned. 
This principle applies according to the legal experts and to the 
International Court of Justice (see the "Nicaragua" case), 
whatever the situation.
It is extremely difficult to define the prohibitions and the in­
junctions that are implied by each principle separately. Is dis­
criminatory behaviour humanitarian? According to the Commentary 
on Article 70 of Protocol 1, impartiality is "a moral quality 
which must be present in the individual or institution called
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upon to act for the benefit of those who are suffering" (p. 818, 
para. 2800). Together with the condition of the humanitarian na­
ture" of assistance and the principle of non-discrimination, it 
guarantees that relief work is intended solely for the purpose of 
assisting the victims according to their needs and of giving 
priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
Indeed a relief operation whose purposes are not exclusively 
humanitarian would not comply with the condition of neutrality 
and would, therefore, not be in accordance with the said prin­
ciples .
Article 70 of Protocol I, not only creates an obligation for the 
State to accept an offer of relief when certain conditions are 
met it also sets out, together with Article 71, the obligations 
that derive from its consent. It is interesting to note that, 
whereas the party to the conflict shall in no way whatsoever 
delay the forwarding of relief consignments, "except in cases of 
urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population 
concerned", the participation of relief personnel is subject to 
the approval of the party concerned. Once their participation is 
accepted, their activity can be limited or their movements 
restricted - temporarily - only in case of imperative military 
necessity. The relief personnel, for their part, must not exceed 
the terms of their mission and shall take account of the security 
requirements of the party; otherwise their mission may be ter­
minated .
These rules, like other relevant provisions of Protocol I, con­
stitute a prime example of the balance struck by the States be­
tween considerations of humanity and military necessity. In 
general, assistance should not be presented as being in conflict 
with the sovereignty. Relief operations need the co-operation 
and the good will of the local authorities. Efforts should be 
aimed at convincing all concerned that international law reflects 
sovereignty and that there should be no contradiction between the 
rule of law and that sovereignty.
4. MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
The refusal of a relief action in situations where the conditions 
laid down by the law are fulfilled is an act contrary to interna­
tional humanitarian law and must be dealt with as such. This 
leads us to examine what means can be used in order to prevent or 
repress violations of international humanitarian law.
I am not going to elaborate on the subject of the measures that 
an or must be taken to prevent violations of humanitarian law. 
'his branch of international law suffers from the fact that there 
i widespread ignorance of its rules, also among the public.
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The United Kingdom, thanks notably to the efforts of the British 
Red Cross, is one of the few exceptions. Dissemination of 
humanitarian law should be developed, and anyone complaining 
about non-observance of its rules should be encouraged to ask for 
wider dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and their Addi­
tional Protocols.
According to the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, which have been approved by the States, the 
ICRC must work for the faithful application of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. This sentence 
reflects in a general way the mandate conferred on the ICRC by 
international humanitarian law. Indeed, an international armed 
conflicts, the ICRC has the right to visit prisoners of war and 
to have access to civilian persons protected by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (for example, inhabitants of occupied territory). In 
exercising these rights, the ICRC is entitled to supervise the 
application of the Geneva Conventions by the parties to an inter­
national conflict. It has also the responsibility to perform the 
functions of the Central Tracing Agency, i.e. the centralisation 
of all information regarding prisoners of war and civilians in­
terned or arrested and the forwarding of this information to 
their countries of origin, so that the authorities can inform 
their relatives of their whereabouts.
In situations of non-international armed conflict, the ICRC has a 
right of initiative that allows it to carry out similar tasks in 
favour of the victims.
Thus we see that the ICRC is entitled by the law to engage, as 
soon as an armed conflict arises, in activities that are essen­
tially aimed at preventing violations of international 
humanitarian law. When necessary, it can make representations 
to the parties to a conflict to encourage them to act in accor­
dance with the rules of intentional humanitarian law.
Besides the ICRC, the United Nations and, more especially, the 
bodies that have set up to promote human rights can also con­
tribute to improve respect for humanitarian law. States, for 
their part, can discourage a third State from violating 
humanitarian law by exerting diplomatic pressure or taking other 
measures in conformity with international law. The ICRC is 
nevertheless the sole body that is expressly entitled to act in 
favour of the victims of an armed conflict and which has the duty 
to do so in every situation qualified as an armed conflict. This 
means that its activities must be based on purely humanitarian 
considerations and have to respect the principle of impartiality.
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Assistance that is not provided in compliance with the principles 
of humanity, non-discrimination and impartiality does not respect 
the framework of humanitarian law, and has consequences that en­
danger the aims of this law as well as the values it sets out to 
protect. It is, therefore, quite understandable that the rules 
concerning international assistance to victims of war also 
provide for the control of the distribution of relief, and that 
the body the States may ask to exercise such control is the same 
as the one which is entitled to supervise the application of 
humanitarian law, that is, the ICRC (and the protecting power, 
should one have been designated by the parties to the conflict.
5. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF DURING 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
As far as non-international armed conflicts are concerned, the 
situation is a little different, as there is no institution ex­
pressly empowered to monitor the application of humanitarian law 
by the parties. The ICRC, of course, has a right of initiative 
and under the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement has the duty to do its utmost to ensure respect 
for humanitarian law, whatever the nature of the conflict. 
However, even if State practice shows that the principle of the 
presence of the ICRC in internal armed conflicts is recognised, 
the means to be employed in ensuring observance of humanitarian 
rules in such conflicts have yet to be clearly determined.
This situation is paradoxical, since on the one hand these con­
flicts are now predominant, and on the other, they usually give 
rise to numerous and grave violations of humanitarian law.
The underdeveloped state - so to speak - of the law applicable to 
internal armed conflicts is also apparent from the fact that very 
few rules, in comparison to the hundreds that must be observed in 
international armed conflicts, govern this type of conflict. 
Indeed, only Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of the 
1949 and Protocol II, additional to those Conventions, to which 
almost a hundred States are now party, apply to these situations,
As this kind of conflict is now the most common, the law ap­
plicable to the non-international armed conflicts constitutes the 
legal framework of most contemporary relief operations in favour 
of conflict victims. in this respect, Article 18 of Protocol II, 
which is the sole provision dealing with international relief un- 
er the law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, deserves special attention.
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This provision is formulated in a very similar way to Article 70 
of Protocol 1, and the same general conditions for the legality 
of an international relief action are laid down.' However, Ar­
ticle 18, has been criticised for the fact that the authority 
that must give its consent to an offer of services is the legal 
government, even if the action proposed is in favour of the 
civilian population of an area controlled by rebels. A complete 
transposition of the rules applicable to international armed con­
flict seems, however, given the nature of internal armed con­
flict, difficult. A resolution adopted recently by the Council 
of Delegates, a body composed of representatives of the ICRC, of 
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and of the Federation of 
these Societies, urges the States "to allow free passage of 
medicines and medical equipment, foodstuffs, clothing and other 
supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of 
another contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary, 
it being understood that they are entitled to ensure that the 
consignments are not diverted from their destination"
These considerations must not obscure the fact that, if consent 
is not given in a situation where the conditions for relief ac­
tion are fulfilled, such refusal constitutes a violation of 
humanitarian law. Means that are compatible with international 
law and that do not jeopardise its aims and values can be used to 
convince the party concerned to act in conformity with the law. 
Refusal to accept a relief action would nevertheless be treated 
like another breach of humanitarian law. There is no reason for 
it to give rise to a stronger reaction on the part of the inter­
national community than others violations. On the contrary, it 
could be said that the civilian population is often in need of 
relief supplies because of previous violations of humanitarian 
law, leading to dependence on international relief, and 
frequently those previous violations did not arouse the interest 
of the international community.
6. CONCLUSION
International relief during armed conflicts enters in a legal 
framework which ensures that relief benefits only the victims of 
the armed conflict and does not jeopardise the aims and values 
safeguarded by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols. If that is the case, international relief contributes 
to one of the most generous fields of human activity, that is, 
alleviating the suffering of the victims of war. The solutions 
to problems arising out of a situation of armed conflict are as 
interdependent as the problems themselves. What is needed is a 
comprehensive approach that takes into account all the factors 
that hinder, or on the contrary favour, the observance of 
humanitarian law.
ANNEX 8
RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT:
THE LEGAL PROBLEMS AND A SUGGESTION TO CIRCUMVENT THEM
FRANCOISE J. HAMPSON
1. INTRODUCTION
Denise Plattner has explained the bilateral legal relationship 
between the relief organisation and the receiving State. The 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) can point to rules of inter­
national law which give rise to an entitlement, or at the very 
least a legitimate expectation, on the part of the NGO that it 
will be allowed to work, even in a conflict situation. The fact 
that States create innumerable obstacles and may even deny the 
NGO the right to operate does not absolve NGOs from the respon­
sibility of putting what pressure they can on the State, invoking 
the rules of international law.
The chances of success in bilateral negotiations will be enhanced 
if other bodies, States and inter-governmental organisations 
(IGOs), are also bringing pressure to bear. Those agencies have 
considerable leverage, whether in the form of the withholding of 
benefits or by threatening to apply some form of sanction. The 
relief agencies need to ensure that pressure is applied and ap­
plied effectively. The uttering of noble sentiments by States 
acting independently of one another is not likely to achieve any­
thing. The pressure must be co-ordinated and it must be applied 
earlier. If this is left to States themselves, little will be 
done. They are reluctant to be perceived as intervening. They 
tend to be so preoccupied with the present crisis that they fail 
to address the next one when it is still manageable and to 
prevent altogether the one after that. Left to their own 
devices, States' responses seem to be based exclusively on 
political considerations. The thesis of this paper is that those 
States are themselves under legal obligations when another State 
refuses to allow a relief organisation to work or imposes unac­
ceptable conditions. If public opinion is mobilised, pressure 
can be put on donor States. They may feel that they are respond­
ing to domestic political pressure but the way that will be ex­
pressed is in terms of the legal obligations of the donor State. 
That should, in turn, make it easier to apply pressure to receiv­
ing States. International and bilateral political pressure on 
maY apPear more unfriendly than appeals, reinforced by fhreat of sanctions, to respect legal obligations which the 
receiving State has itself accepted.
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This paper will examine briefly the difficulties in the present 
international arrangements for conflict prevention and resolution 
and assuring that relief supplies reach the civilian population. 
That concerns principally political problems in the United Na­
tions. Two possible ways round those difficulties will then be 
discussed. If the avenues pursued to date appear to have led to 
a dead-end, more is likely to be achieved by finding an alterna­
tive, albeit longer, route.
Whilst the situation would appear simple enough - people who will 
die unless they receive relief and organisations wanting to meet 
that need - in fact the situation is extraordinarily complicated. 
There are three types of actors involved, each type containing 
agencies with slightly different characteristics. The situation 
involves States, IGOs and NGOs. At least four types of interna­
tional legal regimes are involved: the "traditional" regime whose 
starting point is the sovereignty of the nation-State; the human 
rights regime which sets limits on the conduct of a State with 
regard to those within its jurisdiction, including its own 
citizens; international humanitarian law, which regulates the 
conduct of armed conflicts so as to protect to the greatest de­
gree possible the civilian population and the refugee law regime. 
As if this were not enough, the situation on the ground is ex­
acerbated by the conflict itself. Even if States, IGOs and NGOs 
were pulling in the same direction and even if all the parties, 
including the State receiving relief, were eager to ensure that 
people received relief supplies, the fact of the conflict would 
make the attainment of the objective more difficult. That is but 
one of the many reasons why political efforts need to be directed 
at conflict prevention.
2. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PREVENTION OF CONFLICT
One of the purposes of the United Nations is to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace. The Security Council is the organ principally charged 
with the taking of effective action in the face of threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The Charter 
itself contains potentially effective mechanisms, such as provi­
sions on a UN army, which have never been used. Peace-making 
must not be confused with peace-keeping operations. Every UN 
member has accepted the obligation to settle any international 
dispute by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independ­
ence of any State.
2
The weaknesses in the system do not merely arise from the politi­
cal context, such as the Cold War. There are major difficulties
of a substantive and of an institutional character. Votes of the 
Security Council on non-procedural matters are subject to the 
veto power of the permanent members. They vote not only to 
protect their own interests but also those of allies. Perhaps 
the most important constraint on the United Nations in the field 
of conflict prevention is the provision in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter that "Nothing contained in the... Charter shall authorise 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State ...". In a period 
of increasing tension between two States, it can be difficult for 
the issue to come before the Security Council unless the parties
wish to seize the United Nations with the dispute. In the case
of increasing tension within a State, it is extraordinarily dif­
ficult for the matter to come before the Security Council, on ac­
count of the prohibition of interference in internal affairs. 
The State concerned will not admit its need for help at this 
stage because that would call into question one of the elements 
of sovereignty, the ability to exercise effective authority. 
Other related issues include the State's fear of the tacit recog­
nition of "rebels". Other States are unwilling to raise the mat­
ter in the Security Council because, in the same position, they 
would insist on respect for their own sovereignty. Sovereignty, 
in other words, takes precedence over human rights. The response 
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was wholly exceptional.
It is easier to keep the genie of conflict in the bottle than to 
put it back once it has escaped. The UN needs to be able to 
identify situations of potential conflict and to offer practical 
assistance which will not challenge a State's sovereignty. Where 
famine is the product of conflict, it may be difficult to an­
ticipate the famine before the outbreak of fighting. Where the 
fighting is a possible product of drought, however, effective 
relief schemes need to be established before the situation is ex­
acerbated by conflict.
The UN needs to be able to initiate such proposals and to apply a 
certain pressure on the State in question. If the only criteria 
are the needs of people and effectiveness, it is in the area of 
conflict prevention that most could be achieved. Experience 
since the end of the Cold War suggests, however, that any such 
hopes are, for the time being, unrealistic.
3. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
In the past, the UN experienced similar difficulties in taking 
effective action once the conflict had broken out. In some in-
e s t h e  Security Council was able to pass resolutions but
1 tie changed on the ground. The same was true in internal con-
Tm’n Wlth the end of the Cold War' the Secretary-General ofun nas been more willing to consider using his good offices.
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He has, for example, dispatched both Cyrus Vance and Marek Gould- 
ing to Yugoslavia, the one to try to achieve a cease-fire and the 
other to determine whether there was a basis for the deployment 
of peace-keeping forces. The Secretary-General presumably thinks 
that he has the active or passive acceptance of the Security 
Council.
The Security Council itself is proceeding very cautiously. In 
certain instances, four of the five permanent members have been 
prepared to show a limited flexibility on questions of 
sovereignty and human rights but the People's Republic of China 
is particularly reluctant to find itself involved in an internal 
conflict. The attitude of the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council varies. This analysis may come as a surprise to 
those filled with post-Gulf conflict euphoria as to the pos­
sibilities of UN action. The international action to protect the 
Kurds could provide a model for "humanitarian intervention" but 
there are grounds for doubting that that will be the case. The 
situation was unique. There had just been an international con­
flict, the forces were already there and the international com­
munity was in a position to dictate terms to Saddam Hussein. The 
response of the coalition forces was not simply a product of the 
needs of the Kurds. Those same States had taken no effective ac­
tion following the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds at 
Halabja. The presence of the world media brought the plight of 
the Kurds into people's living rooms, generating political pres­
sure within the coalition States. A further element may have 
been some sense of responsibility; to some, it appeared that the 
Iraqis had been urged to stage an insurrection. It should also 1 
be noted that certain NGOs are concerned that States should have 
taken over the provision of relief, using their armed forces. It 
may run the risk of politicising their own role.
One useful precedent in the situation has been used before and 
could be used again. As we have seen, the UN can only deal with 
situations which pose a threat to international peace and 
security and cannot address the internal affairs of a State. 
Turkey claimed that the threatened, and then the actual, influx 
of refugees threatened international peace and the stability of 
the region. Austria expressed similar concerns during the con­
flict between "Yugoslavia" and Slovenia. If a threatened trans- 
border refugee flow is sufficient to constitute a threat to in­
ternational peace, the Security Council could be seized with many 
situations, were it not for the risk of the veto and/or political 
indifference.
The "Yugoslav" model affords only a limited useful precedent. 
"Yugoslavia", was persuaded or encouraged to seek external assis­
tance. That enabled the Security Council to address the situa­
tion but it has proceeded very cautiously. A State seeking help 
may consider that it will have to pay a considerable political 
price. They may think that it will involve the implicit recogni­
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tion of the status of the fighters or belligerents. A government 
is only likely to take such a course of action where it believes 
it cannot win, at least in the sense of returning to the status 
quo ante. Such appeals are only likely to be made where the 
parties have already fought and see themselves as having more to 
lose than gain by continuing to fight. They may need outside 
help to come with a package which they cannot be seen to propose 
but may be prepared to accept. That could create the space and 
time for political discussions. Such an approach is not likely 
to be effective where there is no will to stop fighting and/or no 
will to accept political facts. The approach is bound to be in­
effective where there is no authority capable of binding anyone, 
not least because there is no one with the authority to ask for 
assistance. Such situations arose in Liberia and, more recently, 
Somalia. There is no precedent for UN involvement in an internal 
conflict without a request from the State in question, unless the 
situation gives rise to an international threat. The protection 
of the Kurds is, for these purposes, to be treated as a 
postscript to the larger Gulf conflict. The UN cannot impose a 
solution. It can only help where a solution is more important 
than victory. That equation is an internal question. External 
pressure to create the necessary internal conditions, for example 
by means of financial sanctions and arms embargoes, is not likely 
to be very effective.
A final point relating to the provision of relief in conflict 
situations concerns the role of the media. They appear only to 
be able to concentrate on one conflict at a time. One may specu­
late whether the lack of internal authority is sufficient ex­
planation for apparent UN inaction in the face of the deteriorat­
ing conflicts in Liberia and Somalia. It may be relevant that 
the press, in Western Europe at least, was preoccupied by the 
situation in the Gulf and the conflicts in Eastern Europe at the same time.
4. THE UN, INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND RELIEF OPERATIONS
The focus of NGOs is on getting relief to people in need. The
other actors, IGOs, donor States and the receiving State, have
other concerns at least as high on their individual agenda. The
legal/political question of sovereignty and the recognition of 
"rebels", which preoccupies the receiving State, is compounded by 
the difficulty of negotiating with "rebel" groups and getting 
agreements to stick. Renamo provides but one, notorious example. 
Donor states are concerned by the high proportion of relief which 
disappears through corruption. There is domestic political pres- 
^ re tc? seek value for money. At best, this affects how, rather 
than whether, they provide assistance. The UK, for example, 
favours using NGOs to distribute relief. Possible grass-roots 
support m  donor States is subject to the risk of donor fatigue, 
particularly where the same States are in recurrent need of as­
sistance. This is exacerbated where the people are seen as
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responsible for their situation, as in the case with certain con­
flicts as opposed to natural disasters. The IGOs tend to have 
specific concerns, such as health or refugees, and may, to some 
extent, be in competition with one another.
The effective provision of relief requires the avoidance of 
duplication, adequate resources and pressure to be put on parties 
to the conflict.
The appointment of a UN relief co-ordinator should help to avoid 
some problems of duplication. The NGOs and IGOs are already used 
to co-operating with other organisations in the same category but 
a senior UN official may assist them in working more closely with 
one another. One contribution which would be of considerable 
significance would be the integration of rehabilitation into 
relief programmes. The relief co-ordinator is, however, likely 
to be frustrated by two problems over which he has neither con­
trol nor authority. He cannot make the political problems disap­
pear. Nor can he deliver the necessary resources. Co-ordination 
can make a little stretch further but it cannot make it enough. 
Only States can provide the resources and the political develop­
ments required. They can be encouraged to do so by, for example, 
pointing out that rehabilitation promotes self-sufficiency 
(economic self-interest) and that refugee flows need to be 
prevented if States are not prepared to cope with the result 
(political self-interest). States can also be subjected to in­
ternal political pressure and external legal pressure. This will 
be discussed further below.
The UN relief co-ordinator only has a hope of improving the 
delivery of relief if other elements are present. This would 
suggest that his appointment may be useful but that he is not, at 
present, capable of achieving much. There is, however, one risk 
in the creation of the post. Everything to do with the UN is to 
a greater or lesser degree politicised. Co-operation between 
NGOs and the co-ordinator may run the risk of appearing to 
politicise previously neutral humanitarian initiatives. It is 
particularly important that any such appearance be avoided if the 
co-ordinator is not to preside over increasing difficulties in 
the provision of relief.
This situation is likely to be particularly frustrating for NGOs. 
There are millions in need of relief and NGOs want to meet that 
need. They find themselves prevented from doing so by forces 
outside their control. The conflict itself produces such 
obstacles but more important are the political factors. NGOs 
have to become pressure groups whilst the starving die. NGOs 
have a proven record in being able to tackle practical problems 
but these difficulties are of a different order. They dilute the 
efforts of NGOs and may lead to discouragement within the or­
ganisations. NGOs need to be able to feel that they are doing
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something to address the problems. This is principally to im­
prove the delivery of relief but also to restore to NGOs the 
sense of being able to contribute to the shaping of events.
5. PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE
At present, it seems fairly safe to predict changes in the inter­
national system but whether they will have any bearing on the 
problems surrounding relief operations is open to question. 
There is no reason for NGOs to believe that the difficulties will 
be adequately addressed by others. It is therefore up to the 
NGOs themselves to seek ways round the problems. Experience sug­
gests that the attempted use of direct political pressure is in­
effective. States are better at it than NGOs and there is the 
risk that NGOs will prejudice their exclusively humanitarian 
character. The organisations therefore need to explore the pos­
sibility of using international law to put pressure on both donor 
and receiving States. A successful outcome would produce politi­
cal changes but the means would be non-political.
6. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PRESSURISE STATES INTO ENSURING 
THAT THOSE IN NEED RECEIVE RELIEF
Two bodies of law offer possibilities to NGOs - humanitarian law, 
also known as the law of armed conflicts, and international human 
rights law. Denise plattner has examined the obligations of 
parties to the conflict to reach agreements with relief organisa­
tions to ensure that the essential needs of the civilian popula­
tion are met. Objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population cannot be attacked. The more detailed rules 
which regulate the conduct of international conflicts expressly 
exclude such attacks except where the food or water is used
solely for the members of armed forces. Even then, the civilian
population cannot be left with inadequate supplies. There is 
provision for a scorched policy but only in national territory 
and in exceptional circumstances. The conduct of non­
international conflicts is not regulated in as much detail but 
the obligation to protect civilians extends to a prohibition of 
attacks on objects indispensable to their survival. The rules 
therefore address the problem from both ends - the conduct of 
hostilities and the provision of relief. Severe difficulties 
have, however, been experienced in practice. Roads may be im­
passable or not secure from attacks. Negotiations between an NGO 
and the "rebels" to ensure the safe transit of a relief convoy 
may be seen by the State authorities as assistance to the
"rebels". The State may also claim that, whilst the food is in­
tended for civilians, in fact it will be used to feed fighters. 
Donor States need to be able to bring pressure to bear on the 
receiving State. if the forces of third States handle the opera- 
lon, as in the case of Iraqi Kurds, there is the appearance of 
n ervention. That is reduced if convoys are escorted by the
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'•blue berets" - forces serving as part of a UN operation - but it 
hardly looks like a peace-keeping operation. The better solution 
is for the parties to agree to the passage of a relief convoy.
States parties to the Geneva Conventions have only only under­
taken to respect the Conventions themselves but also to ensure 
respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. This does not 
just mean that they must ensure that their own forces act in com­
pliance with the rules, for that would be included within the 
States obligation to respect the rules itself. Every State has 
therefore undertaken the obligation to ensure that every other 
State respects the rules. This is reinforced by the provisions 
on criminal liability, which require every State to try a person 
within its jurisdiction who is alleged to have committed "grave 
breaches" of the Conventions, wherever the actions were per­
formed. The UK not only can enquire what a State is doing to 
respect the rules without it being regarded as intervention but 
is under an obligation to do so. States are notoriously unwill­
ing to take effective measures to remind other States of their 
legal obligations, as was seen during the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
They , are, however, vulnerable to domestic political pressure. 
There is a material difference between the enquiry "What are you 
doing to meet the needs of the starving in X?" and "What are you 
doing to give effect to your legal obligation to ensure that NGOs 
can provide relief in X?" The first assumes that relief should 
be provided. It opens the way to moral, economic and political 
argument, as well as to bland responses pointing to undeniable 
practical problems. The second takes as its starting point a 
fact - the ratification of a treaty. The test of the
government's respect for its obligation is that the receiving 
State in turn respects its obligation. That includes the 
requirement that it give consent to NGO relief operations and not 
attack foodstuffs or crops. If that is not happening, the donor 
State is in breach of its obligation to ensure that it does hap­
pen.
In most situations, being realistic, this is the principal way in 
which respect for the Geneva Conventions could be improved, so as 
to ensure the provision of relief. It is a medium-term strategy 
which could create its own momentum. Once used in relation to 
one conflict, parties would come to expect it to be used. The 
United States has recently announced the suspension of landing 
rights for the "Yugoslav" national airline on account of the 
taking hostage by Serbs of a group consisting principally of 
women and children in Bosnia. In the long-term, it might nip in 
the bud potential problems with the delivery of relief. NGOs 
need to co-ordinate this sort of strategy to ensure that govern­
ments are being pressurised from all quarters. Co-ordinated ap­
proaches to all national Western European governments could, for 
example, be reinforced by pressure from the European Parliament. 
The effectiveness of NGO approaches to Foreign Ministries would 
be dramatically enhanced if their supporters were putting pres­
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sure on their Members of Parliament. This is not a party- 
political issue. Five hundred letters to different MPs which 
were forwarded to the Foreign Office, at the same time as a meet­
ing was held between the Foreign Office and a co-ordinating com­
mittee of relief NGOs, would be more likely to achieve a positive 
result than the meeting on its own.
The international human rights law regime offers a greater 
variety of possibilities for action but without the advantage of 
a legal obligation on the part of third States to ensure respect 
for the rules by offending States. In this case, the third 
States need to be shamed into action. There are two approaches 
which the relief agencies can adopt.
The first involves putting pressure on third States, in the ways 
already discussed, to raise the issue of the compliance of the 
receiving State with its human rights obligations in Human Rights 
Commission. This body's mandate derives from the human rights 
provisions in the UN Charter and the Commission reports to 
ECOSOC, which in turn reports to the General Assembly. The Com­
mission consists of the representatives of states serving in that 
capacity. It is therefore a political body handling sensitive 
political issues. This is best illustrated by its response to 
the human rights situation in Iraq. The Sub-Commission, composed 
of independent experts, passed a resolution on the use of chemi­
cal weapons against the Kurds. The Commission decided to take no 
action. That was during the Iran-Iraq conflict. Following the 
conflict over Kuwait, the Commission had no difficulty in ap­
pointing a Special Rapporteur on Iraq. This does not mean that 
there is no point in trying to raise the issue of relief opera­
tions in situations of conflict with the Commission and Sub- 
Commission. The former would have to be done by asking national 
governments represented on the Commission to raise the matter. 
The latter could be done by direct approaches to members of Sub­
commission. The request should be both for the appointment of a 
Rapporteur to produce a study on the problem as a whole (thematic 
Rapporteur) and for the appointment of a country Rapporteur to 
produce a Report on the situation in a particular country where 
difficulties raised by the State are seriously impeding relief 
operations. Again, it is vital that such approaches be co­
ordinated, both between the NGOs themselves and in relation to 
the States targeted. The involvement of supporters would be beneficial.
It must be conceded that the condemnation of the Human Rights 
Commission may have little impact on a State in the throes of a 
civil war. it may, however, provide a context for future assis­
tance, from the IMF for example, and it puts other States on 
notice. it is most likely to be effective where a State is 
drifting towards increasingly repressive measures or where an en­
tity aspires to membership of certain organisations.
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The other mechanism which relief organisations could exploit is 
much more legally and less politically orientated. It appears to 
involve only the State where the conflict is taking place but 
third States can be indirectly involved, through their membership 
of the UN. The mechanisms in question are the reporting systems 
contained in a variety of human rights treaties. Under the In­
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
States are obligated to submit periodic reports on compliance to 
the Human Rights Committee. States have established a broadly 
similar system to monitor compliance with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Whilst food supplies and the conditions of life fall principally 
within the ICESCR, the longer-established Human Rights Committee 
under the ICCPR can also consider the issue under the obligation 
to protect the right to life. It must be emphasised that human 
rights law obligations are those of the State. They are not 
obligations of individuals or groups inter se. The issue of com­
pliance by "rebel" groups cannot be raised except in the context 
of the State's own obligation. What the monitoring bodies need 
is alternative Reports. The Committees indicate in advance which 
State Reports they will be examining. Relief agencies need to 
produce their own, preferably co-ordinated, reports on those 
States and to circulate them to members of the Committee. This 
will enable the Committee to subject the State's Report to more 
effective constructive criticism. The object is a dialogue with 
the State and not merely its condemnation. States are to be led 
rather than pushed in the right direction. Reports submitted by 
NGOs need to contain facts and not allegations. They need to be 
written in the context of the treaty obligation in question. The 
Human Rights Committee submits an annual Report on its work to 
the General Assembly of the UN. In this way, the information 
gets into the UN system and provides an opportunity for NGOs to 
lobby States to take up the issue -at the Human Rights Commission.
7. CONCLUSION
It seems that, at present, there is little scope for addressing 
the underlying legal and political difficulties which relief 
agencies experience in ensuring that those in need receive relief 
supplies in conflict situations. The organisations can only con­
tinue with their patient negotiations with the parties to the 
conflict, in a way designed to meet each particular situation. 
It is vital that the agencies themselves should be seen as 
neutral, impartial and exclusively humanitarian organisations. 
There are, nevertheless, ways in which NGOs can bring indirect 
pressure to bear on the parties by exerting pressure on donor 
States. As a strategy, it requires effort, co-ordination and 
will not yield rapid results. It may, however, contribute to 
creating a climate in which relief operations are accepted by all 
parties as humanitarian and in which parties have more to lose 
than to gain from placing illegitimate obstacles in the way of
10
the relief agencies. Such a strategy does not offer a solution 
to the difficulties, but for the suffering victims of conflict, it is better than nothing.
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